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COLLEGE COACHING CONTRACTS: A
PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE*
MARTIN J. GREENBERG
I. COLLEGE COACHES CONTRACTS
A. Introduction - "The Environment"
When is a contract not a contract? Where is job security as fleeting as
the last seconds of a basketball victory? In what field is an employment
contract broken as easily as made? None other than in the world of college
coaching. At the commencement of the 1988-89 college basketball season,
a total of 39 schools or approximately 13.4% of the 294 Division I institu-
tions had new coaches at the helm.1 This compares with an all-time high of
66 new coaches or approximately 22.8% of Division I schools during the
previous season.2 During the 1980s, approximately 384 coaching changes
have taken place in Division I schools.3 Approximately 53 basketball
coaches have changed jobs since the end of the 1989-90 season.4 The Amer-
ican Football Coaches Association indicates that head football coaches re-
main in NCAA Division I-A football programs for an average of only 2.8
years.5 The number of coaches employed at the 279 schools that have
played in Division I Men's Basketball for all of the past 15 seasons include:
Copyright 1991 by Martin J. Greenberg.
* This article will appear as a chapter in Martin J. Greenberg's upcoming book to be pub-
lished by The Michie Company. This two volume practical guide to sports law, which is sched-
uled for release in the spring of 1992, is intended to serve not just sports law attorneys but all
those who find themselves confronted with legal issues in sport.
1. Basketball Weekly, May 2, 1989, at 4, col. 1.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. The Coaching Game: Turnovers Tell The Story How Long They Stay, U.S.A. Today, Mar.
26, 1990, at 10C, col. 1. Indicated is the number of Division I Basketball coaches hired in the past
10 years according to Basketball Weekly, May 1, 1990, at 15, col. 2.
1989-90 ............................................................... 53
1988-89 ............................................................... 42
1987-88 ............................................................... 39
1986-87 ............................................................... 66
1985-86 ............................................................... 56
1984-85 ............................................................... 26
1983-84 ............................................................... 38
1982-83 ............................................................... 37
1981-82 ............................................................... 37
1980-81 ............................................................... 42
5. M. SPERBER, COLLEGE SPORTS, INC. 158 (1990). According to Sperber,
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10 schools employed 6 coaches (average tenure, 2.5 years)
30 schools employe 5 coaches (3.0 years)
68 schools employed 4 coaches (3.75 years)
102 schools employed 3 coaches (5.0 years)
45 schools employed 2 coaches (7.5 years)
24 schools employed 1 coach (15.0 years) 6
Why is job movement, contract jumping, retirement and firing so char-
acteristic of college coaching? The Job Related Almanac indicates that an
NCAA basketball coach has the 15th most stressful job out of the 260 jobs
listed.7 A coach is defined as "one who trains intensively by instruction,
demonstration, and practice."' 8 This definition certainly does not recognize
the current job environment and employment conditions of the modern day
coach.
The coach of the 1990s is not only required to be an instructor, but also
a fundraiser, recruiter, academic coordinator, public figure, budget director,
television and radio personality, alumni glad hander, and whatever else the
university's athletic director or president may direct the coach to do in the
best interest of the university's athletic program.
Indeed, today's college coach has become a prominent public figure. In
many instances, the coach's name recognition is greater than that of the
university president. In some cases, a coach who exhibits interest in em-
ployment elsewhere other than old "U" may cause a statewide crisis. For
instance, when Bobby Knight, head basketball coach of Indiana University,
entertained an offer of employment from the University of New Mexico,
Knight's actions, and the resultant public furor became a featured story on
network news and even drew the attention of the Indiana legislators.
Stress and the changing nature of the job may be the primary cause for
job movement. Some coaches indicate that "they spend less than 20% of
their working time actually coaching on the court or the field." 9 Jack Hart-
man, former men's basketball mentor at Kansas State University who had
coached for 35 years stated, "[t]he fun was actual on-court coaching, and
working with a kid on and off the court and seeing him grow as a person.
Even when other divisions are factored in, the average stay is only 6.5 years. Similar statis-
tics used to prevail for men's basketball coaches, but now in Division I, like molecules
being heated by NCAA tourney and TV fever, coaches are moving increasingly fast and
have surpassed the football rate. Almost 50 percent of all head basketball coaches changed
jobs between 1986 ahid 1989.
6. U.S.A Today, Mar. 28, 1990, at 10C, col. 1
7. Basketball Weekly, May 2, 1989 at 4, col. 4.
8. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 118 (2d ed. 1983).
9. Chronicle of Higher Education, Mar. 19, 1986, at 39, 40, col. 2.
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That's what attracted us originally and has become obscured by all the
other time demands." 1
In addition to the pressures of college athletics, the coach now faces the
added pressures of the public concern involving student eligibility, aca-
demic progress and, most recently, the posting and disclosure of grades and
graduation rates of student athletes.
The NCAA has passed legislation requiring member institutions to pub-
lish graduation rates for student-athletes making them available to the pub-
lic."1 The legislation calls for disclosure of graduation rates for the entire
student body and for student-athletes to the NCAA. The athlete's data
must be broken down by sports and in football and basketball broken down
by race. Thus, the information on graduation rates that have been disclosed
to the NCAA for many years will now be available to the public. The first
reporting date is October, 1991, at which time the graduation rates for the
last four years will be disclosed. 2
The Chronicle of Higher Education recently published a survey which
included responses from 262 of 295 Division I schools. It took freshmen
going into school in fall of 1984 and counted how many had graduated by
August 1989. The survey indicates:
Some good: The five-year graduation rate for all Division I athletes
entering school in 1984 was 56.1%, far ahead of the 47.9% gradua-
tion rate for all students in general.
Some bad: The graduation rate for football players at Division I-A
schools was only 42.5%, including 32.2% by the Southeastern Con-
ference, 32.5% by the Southwest and 39.4% by the Big Eight.
Some ugly: The graduation rate for basketball players in Division I
was only 39%, and only 31.9% at schools that are Division I in
basketball and Division I-A in football. This includes 14% by the
Southeastern Converence, 18.9% by the Big West Conference,
whose rate for football players was 23.8%."
The article concludes that, "The overall signal is undeniable; schools are
much more lax in graduating football and basketball players than other ath-
letes. There is a crisis of non-graduated students in the sports of big names
and big money."' 4
10. Id.
11. 1990-1991 NCAA DIVISION I BYLAWS. The 84th NCAA Convention adopted this pro-
vision effective 1/10/90 for data collection, 10/1/91 for Division I and 7/1/93 for Division II.
12. Id.
13. Chronicle of Higher Education, Mar. 27, 1991, at Al and A38.
14. Id.
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Because of public disclosure, coaches can no longer just be satisfied with
winning. Coaches cannot afford to ignore when their star athlete misses his
chemistry class or threatens to drop out of school.
College sports has become a big business with.high financial stakes. If
the coach is not bringing in enough revenue, or is not perceived positively'
by the alumni or public, a university may be forced to terminate his em-
ployment for fear of losing large amounts of money. Coach Rich Haddad
was fired as the basketball coach of Jacksonville, concluding a 6-21 season.
"Winning is the bottom line."' 5 Added Haddad, "Schools are looking for
coaches who run clean programs, graduate their players and win big. If you
stumble in any area, you're in trouble. But winning big is the big factor.
And that translates into money."' 16 But, even winning doesn't guarantee
job security. J.D. Barnett had a winning record including two NCAA tour-
nament appearances, a clean slate with the NCAA and a rollover five year
contract at Tulsa when he joined the roll call of fired basketball coaches in
March of 1991. "Where did Barnett go wrong? Tulsa Athletic Director
Rick Dickson said Barnett was fired for not making enough money for the
school. He cited dwindling attendance, contributions and season ticket
sales. He also cited the turnover in the assistant coaches and the student-
athletes not completing his program."' 7 Twenty-four College Football As-
sociation teams that played in 1989-90 bowl games earned a total of $33
million. 8 The 1990 NCAA Men's Basketball Final Four participants, Ar-
kansas, Duke, Georgia Tech, and UNLV, earned an estimated 1.23 million
each for their participation in the Tournament.' 9 Further, the advent of
15. U.S.A. Today, Mar. 27, 1991, at 4C, col. 4.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. The Palm Beach Post, Apr. 30, 1989, at 8C, col. 6.
19. Symonds, March Madness is Getting Even Crazier, Bus. WK., Apr. 2, 1990, at 102.
This year, the NCAA expects to clear about $65 million on tournament receipts of $72.3
million. Next year, the tournament could easily gross $1230 million, thus exacerbating the
problem. The NCAA gets 40% of this year's $65 million, while the other 60% goes to the
64 colleges in the tourney. The 32 teams eliminated in the first round go home with
$286,500 apiece; teams that go to the Final Four each get $1.4 million.
Basketball Weekly, May 2, 1989, at 4, col. --; T.V. revenue from the Final Four in 1970:
$500,000; 1973: $1.1 million; 1979: $5.2 million; 1980: $8.9 million; 1981: $10.3 million; 1982:
$14.6 million; 1987: $36.6 million; 1988: $57.8 million;
An NCAA committee is working on a plan that would change the way basketball tourna-
ment money is distributed. The new plan would, in part, reward schools for the number of
sports sponsored, participation in NCAA championships the last three years and the
number of grants-in-aid provided, rather than simply on progression through the tourna-
ment. Hearings will be held in San Francisco, Chicago and Arlington, Va., June 14, to
explain the plan. If implemented, it would represent a drastic change from the current
payoff system. A look at how round-by-round rewards have grown:
[Vol. 1:207
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major television and cable network contracts for the right to broadcast
these events has created even more revenue for the NCAA and its constitu-
ent universities. CBS has agreed to pay the NCAA $143 million for televi-
sion rights to the NCAA College Basketball Tournament from 1991 to
1997.20 Before Notre Dame left the CFA (College Football Association),
ABC agreed to pay $210 million for five years for the right to telecast CFA
games.2' In 1989, ABC paid $11.8 million for the rights fees to telecast the
Rose Bowl with each team receiving approximately $6.3 million.22 Today's
coaches are faced with a win at any cost dilemma. The pressure to generate
revenues from television, gate receipts, alumni donations and tournament
participation has put the bottom line or balance sheet psychology on an
equal basis with "wins and losses."
Regional
Year Team Round 1 Round 2 Semifinal Regional Final 4
1970 25 8,263 8,263 24,788 24,788 49,576
1975 32 22,230 22,230 66,691 66,691 133,381
1980 48 81,594 81,594 203,986 203,986 326,378
1985 64 150,380 300,760 451,139 601,510 751,899
1990*1 64 286,500 573,000 859,500 1,146,000 1,432,500
*Estimated, final figures should be available by June 27.
Source: NCAA
NCAA Basketball Tournament Pay Outs Grow, U.S.A. Today, May 31, 1990, at 10C, col. 5.
20. U.S.A. Today, December 14, 1989, at 12C, col. -- ; Sports Industry News, March 2, 1990,
at 67, col. 1; CBS will televise the Division I Men's College Basketball Tournament and fifteen
other championships, including the Men's College Basketball Tournament for a seven year period
from 1991 to 1997. The SI billion dollar deal represents approximately $143 million a year. This
package is worth two and one half times the networks' previous television deal which garnered
$55.3 million per year. The annual rights fee in 1980 was $9.3 million (NBA network), in 1982,
$13.3 million (CBS network), and in 1985 $55.3 (CBS network).
21. E. Comte, College Football Focus: Going Regional With ABC, Sporting News, Feb. 5,
1990, at 47. Details of the Notre Dame NBC television agreement: All home football games, six a
year from 1991-95 to be telecast nationally on NBC. The package will begin with a Sept. 7, 1991
visit by Indiana. The Irish will play at home against 16 opponents:
Three games each: Southern California, Boston College, Navy;
Two: Michigan, Michigan State, Pittsburgh, Penn State, Purdue, Stanford, Brigham
Young, Northwestern;
One: Indiana, Tennessee, Air Force, Vanderbilt, Texas.
Revenue is $30 million-split evenly between Notre Dame and visiting schools. ABC or ESPN
retain rights, under their 1991-95 deal with the College Football Association, to broadcast games
when Notre Dame is playing on the road. ABC aired two Notre Dame games in 1989 under its
Big Ten-Pacific 10 contracts; CBS three, under its current CFA deal; ESPN two, under the CFA
cable package; SportsChannel America aired two games on cable. The South Bend, Ind., NBC
affiliate, WNDU, owned by Notre Dame, will continue to telecast all sold-out home games, and
some road games. SportsChannel America retains tape-delay TV rights.
22. U.S.A. Today, Nov. 5, 1990, at 2C, col.-.
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The student athlete of today may be a different athlete than of years ago.
The reverence paid to the coach as a father-figure or surrogate parent may
no longer be. Recent revolts by players have forced coaches out of their
jobs. For instance, San Jose University in January of 1989, experienced a
rebellion among its basketball players. The players announced they would
not play for the team unless coach Bill Berry was fired.23 They accused the
coach of verbal abuse and mental cruelty.24 A players rebellion also oc-
curred in February of 1990 at Drake University when Coach Tom
Abatemarco was reassigned to other athletic department duties 24-hours
after the players stated that they would no longer practice or play for
Abatemarco because of alleged verbal and mental abuse. Drake University
A Look at the Postseason Bowls
Date Time
Dec. 8 4 p.m.
Independence Dec. 15 8 p.m.
Eagle/Aloha Dec. 25 3:30 p.m.
Liberty Dec. 27 8 p.m.
Blockbuster Dec. 28 8 p.m.
All American Dec. 28 7:30 p.m.
Peach Dec. 29 12:30 p.m.
Anaheim Freedom Dec. 29 8 p.m.
Sea World Holiday Dec. 29 7:30 p.m.
John Hancock Dec. 31 2:30 p.m.
Domino's Pizza Copper Dec. 31 5 p.m.
Mazda Gator Jan. 1 11:30 p.m.
Hall of Fame Jan. 1 1 p.m.
Florida Citrus Jan. 1 1:30 p.m.
Mobil Cotton Jan. 1 1:30 p.m.
Sunkist Fiesta Jan. 1 4:30 p.m.
Rose Jan. 1 5 p.m.
Federal Express Orange Jan. 1 8 p.m.
USF & G Sugar Jan. 1 8:30 p.m.
See also, The Sports Industry News, Aug. 5, 1988,
TV Payout
SportChannel $275,000
Mizlou
ABC
ESPN
Raycom
ESPN
ABC
Raycom
ESPN
CBS
TBS
ESPN
NBC
ABC
CBS
NBC
ABC
NBC
ABC
600,000
600,000
1 million
1.25 mill+
600,000
900,000
600,000
1.2 mill.
750,000+
600,000
1.2 mill.
1 mill.
1.3 mill.
3 mill.
2.5 mill.+
? mill.
4.2 mill.
3.25 mill.
at 247, which provides:
Payment Per
Bowl Network Payment Team - 1988 1
Rose ABC $11.8 million $5.8 million
Orange ABC 5.0 million 2.5 million
Sugar ABC 2.5 million 2.6 million
Cotton CBS 3.4 million 2.4 million
Fiesta NBC 2.5 million 2.0 million
Citrus ABC 500,000/barter 1.0 million
Hall of Fame ABC barter $800,000
23. Chronicle of Higher Education, Feb. 1, 1989, at A31, col. 5.
24. Id.
Location
Fresno
Shreveport
Honolulu
Memphis
Miami
Birmingham
Atlanta
Anaheim
San Diego
El Paso
Tucson
Jacksonville
Tampa
Orlando
Dallas
Tempe
Pasadena
Miami
New Orleans
Payment Per Team
$6.3 million
3.5 million
2.7 million
2.5 million
2.5 million
1.1 million
1.0 million
Bowl
California Raisin
Poulan/Weed Eater
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officials denied that they let the basketball players take control over the
program by giving in to player demands.25
With the rise of college sports as a big business, college coaching has
become a game of high stakes where money talks. The position of head
coach may offer not only a salary with institutional fringe benefits, but addi-
tional compensation opportunities which are generally referred to as the
"package." The package might include shoe, apparel and equipment en-
dorsements, television and radio shows, speaking engagements, personal or
public appearances, and summer instructional camps. In addition, the job
may also mean such related perquisites as housing, insurance premiums,
membership in health and country clubs, financial gifts from alumni and
boosters, business opportunities, and the use or the gift of automobiles.
For instance, the income of Vince Dooley, Georgia's athletic director
and football coach, and the income of Hugh Durham, Georgia's basketball
coach illustrate the types of compensation packages in college athletics:
1. Vince Dooley, Athletic Director and Head Football Coach income
from sources outside of University of Georgia Athletic Association (UGA).
$103,000
15,000
12,000
5,250
2,406.12
$137,656.12
TV and radio shows
Endorsement contract with shoe company
Speaking engagements
Summer camps
Endorsement contracts with various athletic
equipment and clothing companies
SUBTOTAL
Income provided by UGA Athletic Association
$ Value (unknown) Home (provided by Athletic Association)
$ Value (unknown) Luxury automobile
$ 95,000 Salary
$ 4,500 Allowance for incidental expenses
$ 26,000 Premium on deferred-income annuity
$ 125,500 SUBTOTAL
$ 263,156.12 TOTAL SPORTS-RELATED INCOME (without value
of house and car)
2. Hugh Durham, Men's Basketball Coach
25. B. Loop, Administrators Deny Basketball Players' Staged Coup, United Press Interna-
tional, Feb. 8, 1990.
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Income from sources outside of UGA Athletic Association
$ 73,000 TV and radio shows
$ 40,000 Speaking engagements
$ 35,000 Endorsement contract with shoe manufacturer
$ 3,000 Endorsement contract with basketball manufacturer
$ 1,500 Endorsement contract with uniform manufacturer
$ 3,600 Housing subsidy
$ Value Basketball camps (unreported)
$ 156,100 SUBTOTAL (plus any unreported income)
Income provided to Durham by UGA Athletic Association
$ 75,000 Salary
$ Value Luxury automobile
$ 75,000 SUBTOTAL
$ 231,000 TOTAL SPORTS-RELATED INCOME (without value of car)
2 6
Because of the lack of job security in coaching, and the amount of
money paid to the coaches for their services, meticulously drafted employ-
ment contracts have become a necessity for both the coach and the univer-
sity. According to Judson Graves,
College athletics is big business. Whatever else they may be-master
strategists, charismatic inspirers of young athletes, or national celeb-
rities-today's college athletic coaches are big businessmen. In the
high-stakes, win at all costs atmosphere of major college athletics,
job security for coaches can be as fleeting as last Saturday's victory,
and complex, tightly drawn employment contracts have become a
necessity for those coaches with enough negotiating leverage to ob-
tain them. These relatively new entrants to the business world oper-
ate in a volatile atmosphere in which hirings and firings often occur
in rapid sequence, and hard legal questions are being raised about
the proper methods of enforcing their employment contracts when
breaches occur.27
This article is organized as a practical guide for those representing the
coach or university when drafting an employment contract. The commen-
tary will focus on Division I coaches' contracts, but the contents herein also
apply to Divisions II and III coaches' contracts. Two essential areas will be
discussed in order that a tightly drawn employment contract can be cre-
ated. First, the practitioner must understand the effect of the law on the
employment contract in a sports industry context. General contract princi-
ples regarding coaching contracts, the implications of Rodgers v. Georgia
26. Note, State Open Records Acts and the NCAA Bylaw Requiring Coaches to Disclose Their
"Athletically-Related" Outside Income: Emptying the Coaches'Pocket For Public Inspection, 16 J.
oF C & U.L. 497, 513 n.104 (1990).
27. Graves, Coaches in the Courtroom, 12 J. OF C. & U.L. 545, 545 (1986).
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Tech. Athletic Ass'n.,8 NCAA rules, and the effect of state open record laws
on the coaching contract will be discussed. Second, this chapter will dis-
cuss and provide examples of clauses that may be contained in the coach's
contract. Employment contracts will vary depending upon the factual cir-
cumstance because of the divergent goals and strategies of the university
and coach. However, a discussion of the important clauses that are gener-
ally found in coaches contracts is the starting point for the practitioner
when drafting the coaching contract. The clauses used in this chapter
originated from actual coaches' contracts, "'The Model University Coach-
ing Contract' (MCC): A Better Starting Point For Your Next Negotia-
tion,"29 and "Coaching Contracts: Some Suggestions on Your Next
Coaching Contract Negotiation And Report From Our Survey."' 0 When
reviewing MCC clauses, one should note that the MCC is university ori-
ented and drafted for purposes of protecting the university and not the
coach. Coaches' contracts can take many forms, unlike the standard player
contracts utilized in the NBA, NFL, NHL and Major League Baseball,
varying from a simple letter of appointment, to a letter agreement, to a
standard university contract or to a fully negotiated contract covering many
of the legal nuances of this unique position.
B. Knowing the Law
As a general principle of law, a promise to tender personal services will
not be specifically enforced by an affirmative decree. This is so primarily
because courts will not force a person to engage in activity against his will,
regardless of a contractual obligation to perform. When this rule is applied
in the area of coaches contracts, the result is that neither the university nor
the court can require a coach to work, even if the coach is contractually
bound to do so. Similarly, a coach cannot force a university to allow him to
work if the university decides to terminate his position or to replace him
with another coach. The university, therefore, may remove the coach from
his position at any time, with or without a valid reason. However, the uni-
versity may have to compensate the coach with monetary damages if the
coach challenges the premature contract termination.
In Coaches in the Courtroom, Judson Graves states that in the context of
coaching contracts, the relationship between the university and the coach
28. Rodgers v. Georgia Tech Athletic Association, 166 Ga. App. 156, 303 S.E.2d 467 (1983).
29. Stoner & Nogay, The Model University Coaching Contract (MCC): A Better Starting
Point For Your Next Negotiation, 16 . oF C. & U.L. 43, 43 (1989).
30. Stoner, Coaching Contract" Some Suggestions on Your Next Coaching Contract Negotia-
tion and Report from our Survey, 27th Annual NACUA Conference (June 23-26, 1987).
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becomes somewhat unbalanced, in that while the coach has clear contrac-
tual remedies against the university for breach of contract, the same may
not be true if the coach decides to terminate performance. 31 Graves be-
lieves that the advantage here lies with the coach "who can breach the con-
tract and leave the relationship with virtual impunity .... -32 Graves states
that the problem is even more acute when the university, in attempting to
enforce its contract, tries to prove precisely how, in monetary terms, it has
been damaged by the coach's termination of the contract.33 According to
Graves:
In theory, at least, an employer is clearly entitled to bring an action
for damages against any employee in breach, and coaches are no
exception. In such cases the recoverable damages are normally mea-
sured by the cost to the employer of obtaining equivalent services
elsewhere, plus consequential damages. Some cases indicated that in
assessing such damages, the market value of the lost services must be
measured against that of the substitute services procured by the em-
ployer to remedy the breach.34
Although these criteria may seem simple and reasonable, a judge or jury
may find it impossible to determine the market value of coaches' contracts.
In addition, most premature terminations are met with animosity on at
least one side, and litigation could serve merely to prolong those negative
public relations and cast a shadow over the institution's athletic program
for years. It may provide difficult to estimate - or compensate for - the vast
array of payments and fringe benefits a coach may have been receiving prior
to the breach. For these reasons, many institutions avoid litigation, even if
the coach is the breaching party.35 Graves concludes that: "As a result,
most employees, and certainly most coaches, have historically been able to
leave their employment virtually at will despite their prior contractual
commitments. 3 6
On the other hand, a university may attempt to obtain equitable relief
by acquiring an injunction to prohibit a contract "jumping" coach from
working for another entity. For example, in 1973, Charles "Chuck" Fair-
banks contracted with the New England Patriots, to act as its general man-
ager and head coach. A later agreement specified that employment should
continue until January, 1983, and also read:
31. Graves, supra note 27, at 548.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 549.
36. Graves, supra note 27, at 549.
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10(b) Fairbanks shall not render services directly connected with
football during the period of his employment other than for
the Patriots except with the express written permission of the
Patriots, which permission shall not be unreasonably
withheld.
(d) Fairbanks shall not render services to another entity not con-
nected with football during the period of employment except
with the express written permission of the Patriots, which per-
mission shall not be unreasonably withheld.37
In 1978, Fairbanks was approached by persons affiliated with the Uni-
versity of Colorado who tried to convince Fairbanks to leave the Patriots
and become the Colorado head football coach. The Patriots sought a court
injunction enjoining Colorado from contracting with Fairbanks while he
was still under contract with the Patriots.3" The District Court in Colorado
entered a preliminary injunction enjoining the University of Colorado, its
regents, president, athletic director, and certain fans from contacting Fair-
banks for the purpose of hiring him for the University.39 On Appeal, the
first district upheld the preliminary injunction forbidding Colorado from
soliciting Fairbanks' services reasoning that Fairbanks' services where
unique and the loss of his services would cause irreparable harm to the
Patriots, and money damages would be difficult to determine." The court
also held that the contractual provisions that required Fairbanks, while
under contract with the Patriots, to refrain from contracting for "services
directly connected with football.. .[or with] another entity not connected
with football," covered entities not in direct competition with the Patriots.41
Therefore, the clause also prohibited Fairbanks from entering into an em-
ployment agreement with the University of Colorado.
A similar situation arose regarding Michigan State University's attempt
to hire George Perles, then under contract with the Philadelphia Stars of
the former United States Football League. In response to the university's
action, the Stars sued the university for $1 million. 2 The case ultimately
ended in a settlement, with the university paying $175,000 in order to ob-
tain Perles' services and protect itself from legal liability.43
37. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc. v. University of Colorado, 592 F.2d 1196, 1998
n.1 (1st Cir. 1979).
38. Id. at 1200.
39. Id. at 1198.
40. Id. at 1198, 1199.
41. Id.
42. M. SPERBER, supra note 5, at 164, 165.
43. Id. at 165.
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In many instances, a coach's contract will contain a unique services
clause, to protect the university from a breaching coach. By agreeing to
this clause, the coach acknowledges that he has a special, unique and excep-
tional skill, and that the university's need for continuity in its coaching - as
well as any further acquisition of coaching experience - will reflect that uni-
queness. The contract will also require the coach to agree that the loss of
his services, prior to the expiration of the contractual term, and without the
university approval, will cause an inestimable loss to the university which
cannot be fairly or adequately compensated for by money damages. Fi-
nally, the coach will be required to promise not to accept employment
under any circumstances as a coach at any other institution, or with any
professional league, or with any other competing entity without first ob-
taining permission from the university.
These clauses are necessary because a university may be unable to ob-
tain a negative injunction due to the "difficulty of proving a coach excep-
tional, difficulty in proving irreplaceability or irreparable harm, difficulty in
proving money damages and difficulty in proving that the coach would not
be unreasonably burdened."'
Because of the university's inability to force the coach to work, and be-
cause of the possibility of protracted litigation, adverse publicity, a cloud
over the athletic department, and presumably a relationship that has deteri-
orated, most universities will let their restless or ambitious coach go with-
out further ado. Unless, of course, the contract contains some type of
financial "buy out" or "release" clause.4'
However, when the coach's contract is terminated by a university prior
to its expiration, the courts have generally allowed the coach to recover
money damages, measured by the "full-rate of contract compensation."
The coach's right to receive this compensation may be reduced if a mitiga-
tion of damages clause in the contract states that the coach's relief will be
offset if he obtains other employment or has earnings from a new job.
Judsen Graves concludes that the victimized coach has a remedy in the
form of full monetary compensation:
Most institutions recognize their continuing liability under the con-
tract and either continue to pay the coach through the contract term
(even though there are no employment duties) or "buy out" the con-
tract for a lump sum. It has been suggested that a lump sum buy-
out at the time of the termination, based on the present value of
44. Stoner, supra note 30, at 6.
45. A "release" clause is defined as a provision "discharg[ing] a claim one has against an-
other." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1159 (5th ed. 1979).
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future payments to come due, is the proper measure of damages in
such a situation rather than the installment method. . .and this
method has been used with many coaches. The theory is that since
the breach is complete upon contract termination, complete dam-
ages are then due as well. The principle is the same, however, and
the adequacy of the remedy clears under either measure.'
The coach's contract today is no longer monetarily a simple matter of
salary and fringe benefits provided by the university. The total compensa-
tion received by the coach commonly referred to as the "package," may
include those financial opportunities normally attendant to the position of
head coach such as "anticipated earnings" from television, radio shows,
athletic summer camps, product endorsements or similar personal appear-
ance opportunities, as well as certain incidental benefits and perquisites
sometime bestowed by alumni and boosters such as a free car, free housing,
life insurance, lodging, complimentary club memberships, trust funds, an-
nuities, complimentary athletic tickets, and attractive investment and busi-
ness opportunities.47
The component parts of the package may flow from a variety of sources,
". some of which may provide their component part pursuant to an obli-
gation (such as the employer's obligation to pay salary), while others may
provide elements of the package under no legal obligation, but simply out of
a desire to aid the athletic program or curry favor with the celebrity
coach."48
The legal question becomes to what extent may a terminated coach re-
cover consequential loss of his collateral opportunities even when the uni-
versity did not agree to be contractually liable for them, or their aggregate
value is substantially in excess of the coach's basic salary and university
provided fringe benefits.49
C. Rodger v. Georgia Tech. Athletic Association5"
Rodgers v. Georgia Tech Athletic Association,51 is the leading case as to
whether a coach may recover monetary damages for breach of contract in-
cluding consequential loss of collateral opportunities. Franklin C. "Pep-
per" Rodgers was removed by Georgia Tech from his head football
coaching position on December 18, 1979, two years before the expiration of
46. Graves, supra note 27, at 550.
47. Id. at 551.
48. Id. at 551.
49. Id. at 551.
50. Rodgers, 166 Ga. App. 156, 303 S.E.2d 457 (1983).
51. Id.
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his contract. Rodgers' initial contract was in the form of a letter dated
April 20, 1977 with the defendant, a non-profit corporate entity separate
from the university, but responsible for the university's varsity's athletic
program.
Rodgers' contract provided that in addition to regular compensation, as
an employee of the Association, you would be entitled "to various insurance
and pension benefits and perquisites" as you become eligible therefor.5 2 Af-
ter termination, the Association had continued to pay Rodgers his normal
monthly salary plus pension-insurance benefits. 3 Rodgers suit which was
for damages in excess of $496,000.00 was for "perquisites" over and above
the normal compensation covered under his coaching contract.5 4
Rodgers argued he was entitled to twenty-nine perquisites for which he
grouped into two categories." The first category included items provided
directly to him by the Association but discontinued when he was fired.5 6
The second category included items provided through sources other than
the Association by virtue of his position as head football coach.57 'What
follows is a list of those perquisites as included in the appendix to the case:
A. Benefits and Perquisites Received by Rodgers Directly from
Georgia Tech Athletic Association.
(1) gas, oil, maintenance, repairs, other automobile expenses;
(2) automobile liability and collision insurance;
(3) general expense money;
(4) meals available at the Georgia Tech training table;
(5) eight season tickets to Georgia Tech home football games
during fall of 1980 and 1981;
(6) two reserved booths, consisting of approximately 40 seats at
Georgia Tech home football games during fall of 1980 and
1981;
(7) six season tickets to Georgia Tech home basketball games
for 1980 and 1981;
(8) four season tickets to Atlanta Falcon home football games
for 1980 and 1981;
(9) four game tickets to each out-of-town Georgia Tech foot-
ball game during fall of 1980 and 1981;
(10) pocket money at each home football game during fall of
1980 and 1981;
52. Id. at -, 303 S.E.2d at 469.
53. Id. at -, 303 S.E.2d at 470.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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(11) pocket money at each out-of-town Georgia Tech football
game during fall of 1980 and 1981;
(12) parking privileges at all Georgia Tech home sporting
events;
(13) the services of a secretary;
(14) the services of an administrative assistant;
(15) the cost of admission to Georgia Tech home baseball
games during spring of 1980 and 1981;
(16) the cost of trips to football coaches' conventions, clinics,
and meetings and to observe football practice sessions of
professional and college football terms;
(17) initiation fee, dues, monthly bills, and cost of membership
at the Capital City Club;
(18) initiation fee, dues, monthly bills, and cost of membership
at the Cherokee County Club;
(19) initiation fee and dues at the East Lake County Club.
B. Benefits and Perquisites Received by Rodgers from Sources
Other Than the Georgia Tech Athletic Association by Virtue of
Being Head Coach of Football.
(1) profits from Rodgers' television football show, "The Pepper
Rodgers Show," on Station WSB-TV in Atlanta for the fall
of 1980 and 1981;
(2) profits from Rodgers' radio football show on Station WGST
in Atlanta for the fall of 1980 and 1981;
(3) use of a new Cadillac automobile during 1980 and 1981;
(4) profits from Rodgers' summer football camp, known as the
"Pepper Rodgers Football School," for June 1980 and June
1981;
(5) financial gifts from alumni and supporters of Georgia Tech
for 1980 and 1981;
(6) lodging at any of the Holiday Inns owned by Topeka Inn
Management, Inc. of Topeka, Kansas, for the time period
from December 18, 1979 through December 31, 1981;
(7) the cost of membership to Terminus International Tennis
Club in Atlanta for 1980 and 1981;
(8) individual game tickets to Hawks basketball and Braves
baseball games during 1980 and 1981 seasons;
(9) housing for Rodgers and his family in Atlanta for the period
from December 18, 1979 through December 31, 1981;
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(10) the cost of premiums of a $400,000.00 policy on the life of
Rodgers for the time period from December 18, 1979
through December 31, 1981.58
These perquisites were not defined in Pepper Rodgers' contract. The
Association moved for summary judgment arguing that (1) it had met its
contractual obligation by continuing to pay Rodgers as required under the
contract, (2) it could not be held responsible for Rodgers' collateral oppor-
tunities with third party providers, or (3) it could not be held liable for
actions of individuals not related to the contract who decided to cease pro-
viding Rodgers gratuitous items as a result of his position as head coach.5 9
The trial court granted the Association's motion for summary judgment
dismissing Rodgers' suit in its entirety. According to Judson Graves:
Had this decision gone unchallenged, it would have essentially pre-
served the traditional view described previously, by which the
breaching employer's liability is limited to the amount of direct com-
pensation and related compensatory benefits (such as pension contri-
butions, for example) which the employee would have received for
the balance of the term of employment had the contract not been
terminated early.'
Rodgers' appeal, and the appellate decision "broke new ground in Georgia
and that may help litigants elsewhere do the same, in expanding the ele-
ments of damages potentially recoverable in these coaches' contract
cases."
61
The Court of Appeals held that some perquisites may be recoverable
even though received by Rodgers from third parties not controlled or re-
lated to the defendant, if the defendant knew that their loss may be occa-
sioned by relieving Rodgers of his position.62 In essence, the Court of
Appeals found that perquisites could be recovered if all of the following
elements were met:
1. The damages must be traced solely to the breach;
2. The damages must be capable of exact computation;
3. The damages must have arisen naturally and according to the
usual course of things from such breach; and
4. The damages must be such as the parties contemplated them as
a probable result of the breach.63
58. Id. at -. 303 S.E.3d at 474 (1983).
59. Id. at -, 303 S.E.2d at 474 (1983).
60. Graves, supra note 27, at 553.
61. Id.
62. Rodgers, 303 S.E.2d at 467, 471.
63. Id. at -, 303 S.E.2d at 472, 473.
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As result, the Court of Appeals' decision excluded certain damages as a
matter of law, while other categories of damages were remanded for a jury
trial on the merits."
Of the twenty-nine perquisites that Rodgers tried to collect, eight were
thrown out by the court and the other twenty-one were sent to the jury to
decide if they were perquisites that were recoverable under the contract and
under the elements as previously stated.6" Graves states that the impor-
tance of the case is that the Rodgers decision:
... acknowledged that some collateral losses may be recovered if
they can be proven with specificity and that in a special class of
cases, extraordinary damages may be probably recoverable by an
employee if the employment position is such that it provides a
unique status and presents the employee with special opportunities
to further one's name and reputation, as well as to earn money sub-
stantially over and above salary and fringe benefits.66
The case of McLaughlin v. Union-Leader Corp.67, also provides gui-
dance for the construction of personal service contracts. McLaughlin in-
volved a five year personal service contract of an advertising manager who
worked for a New Hampshire newspaper. After the execution of the agree-
ment, the newspaper installed a new advertising manager and placed Mc-
Laughlin on an "indefinite leave of absence" with pay. When McLaughlin
sued for breach of contract, the newspaper stopped paying his salary, assert-
ing that McLaughlin had breached the contract by rendering inadequate
performance. The jury rejected the newspaper's argument and awarded
McLaughlin a substantial verdict which was upheld on appeal.6"
The turning point of the case was when the court recognized a breach
on the part of the newspaper, both in its refusal to pay McLaughlin's salary
and its denial of the position he had contracted to receive.69 To support its
holding, the court cited Section 433 of the Restatement of Agency:
If the [agent] ... is to receive a fixed salary, a promise by the princi-
pal to furnish him with work is inferred from a promise to the em-
ployee only if it is found that the anticipated benefit to the agent
from doing the work is a material part of the advantage to be re-
ceived by him from the employment. This anticipated benefit may
be the acquisition of skill or reputation by the employee or the acqui-
sition of subsidiary pecuniary advantages, as in the case of the em-
64. Id. at -, 303 S.E.2d at 474.
65. Id. at -, 303 S.E.2d at 474, 475.
66. Graves, supra note 27, at 554.
67. 99 N.H. 492, 116 A.2d 489 (1955).
68. Id. at-, 116 A.2d at 491.
69. Id. at -, 116 A.2d at 492.
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ployment of public performers whose reputation will be enhanced by
their appearance or diminished by their failure to appear beginners
in a trade or profession, and those whose compensation is likely to
be enhanced by receiving gratuities from outside sources .... 70
In holding that the removal of McLaughlin from the position promised
to him constituted a separate and distinct breach of his contract, the New
Hampshire court took a significant step toward recognizing certain employ-
ment positions as including far more than merely the opportunity to work
for an employer and earn the agreed upon compensation.
Under this reasoning, preventing an employee ascending to a sufficiently
unique employment position (such as that of a coach) could constitute a
separate breach of contract, and render the employer liable in damages,
even if that employer continued to pay -the full contract compensation.
Damages in such a situation could flow from the loss of the kinds of "sub-
sidiary pecuniary advantages" and the "gratuities from outside sources" de-
scribed in the Restatement.71 In sum, relieving an employee from a position
could constitute a compensable loss in addition to the paid compensation to
which the employee is clearly entitled under the contract. Moreover, in the
area of major college coaching, the value of the lost "subsidiary pecuniary
advantages" and "gratuities," such as alumni gifts, television revenues, en-
dorsements, etc., could easily (and often does) exceed the combination of a
base salary and related compensation paid by an employer.72
Based on decisions such as Rodgers73 and McLaughlin74, a coach re-
lieved of a position prior to the expiration of the contract can assert that
unless the contract specifically precluded such recovery, the coach may be
entitled to damages for the monetary losses the employer knew or should
have known would be occasioned by a breach. To prevent the occurrence
of such damages, the contract should specifically state how collateral busi-
ness opportunities are to be addressed. The contract should not leave any
doubt as to what is within the contemplation of both parties with respect to
liability for such items, in the event the relationship is prematurely
dissolved.
70. Id. at -, 116 A.2d at 492, 493.
71. Id.
72. Graves, supra note 27, at 555, 556.
73. 166 Ga. App. 156, 303 S.E.2d 467 (1983).
74. 99 N.H. 492, 115 A.2d 489 (1955).
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D. National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Regulations
The drafters of any coach's contract should consider external rules and
policies which will have an impact upon the contractual terms. Such exter-
nal rules and policies will come from the NCAA, the conference to which
the university belongs, and the university itself.
Current NCAA rules affecting coach's contracts are as follows:
a. Article 11, Section 2.1, Stipulation That NCAA Enforce-
ment Provisions Apply:
Contractual agreements or appointments between a coach
and a institution shall include the stipulation that a coach
who is found in violation of NCAA regulations shall be sub-
ject to disciplinary or corrective action as set forth in the
provisions of the NCAA enforcement procedures.75
b. Section 11.2.1.1, Termination of Employment:
Contractual agreements or appointments between a coach
and an institution shall include the stipulation that a coach
may be terminated if the coach is found to be involved in
deliberate and serious violations of NCAA regulations.76
c. Section 11.2.2, Report of Athletically Related Income:
Contract agreements, including letters of appoint, between a
full-time or part-time coach and an institution shall include
the stipulation that the coach is required to report annually
(in writing or orally) all athletically related income and bene-
fits from sources outside of the institution through the athlet-
ics director to the institution's chief executive officer.
Sources of such income shall include, but are not limited to,
the following: (a) Income from annuities; (b) sports camps;
(c) housing benefits (including preferential housing arrange-
ments); (c) country-club memberships (e) complimentary
ticket sales; (f) television and radio programs, and
(g) endorsement or consultation contracts with athletic
shoe, apparel or equipment manufacturers.77
d. Section 11.3.2.1, Bona Fide Outside Employment:
A staff member may earn income in addition to the institu-
tional salary by performing services for outside groups, pro-
vided the compensation is for additional work actually
performed and at a rate commensurate with the going rate in
that locality for services of like character, further, such
75. 1991-92 NCAA DIVISION I BYLAWS, Art. 11.2.1.
76. Id. at 11.2.1.1.
77. Id. at 11.2.2.
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outside work must be in conformity with institutional policy
and with the approval of the institution.7 s
e. Section 11.3.2.2, Supplemental Pay:
An outside source is prohibited from paying or regularly
supplementing an athletics department staff member's an-
nual salary and from arranging to supplement that salary for
an unspecified achievement. This includes the donation of
cash from outside sources to the institution earmarked for
the staff member's salary or supplemental income. It would
be permissible for an outside source to donate funds to the
institution to be used as determined by the institution, and it
would be permissible for the institution, at its sole discretion,
to use such funds to pay or supplement a staff member's
salary.79
f. Section 11.3.2.3, Bonuses for Specific and Extraordinary
Achievement:
An institution may permit an outside individual, group or
agency to supplement an athletics department staff mem-
ber's salary with a direct cash payment in recognition of a
specific and extraordinary achievement (e.g., contribution
during career to the athletics department of the institution,
winning a conference or national championship, number of
games or meets won during career), provided such a cash
supplement is in recognition of a specific achievement and is
in conformance with institutional policy. 0
g. Section 11.3.2.4, Extra Compensation Restriction for Divi-
sion II and Division III Coaches:
A member institution shall not give extra compensation or
renumeration of any sort to any coach conditioned upon or
because of the number of games the coach's team wins, or
because the team goes to a bowl game or tournament or par-
ticipates in championships. These limitations on extra coin-
pensation to coaches do not apply where enforceable
contracts or formal security-of-employment commitments in
effect on August 15, 1976, make it impossible to comply with
the limitations. These exceptions are continued until ex-
isting contracts or formal security-of-employment commit-
ments expire."'
78. Id. at 11.3.2.1.
79. Id. at 11.3.2.2.
80. Id. at 11.3.2.3.
81. 1991-92 NCAA DIVISION II & III BYLAWS, Art. 11.3.2.4.
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h. Section 11.3.2.5, Endorsement of Commercial Products:
Athletic department staff members shall not use, directly or
by implication, the institution's name or logo in the endorse-
ment of commercial products or services for personal gain
without prior approval from the institution.
2
L Section 11.3.2.6, Promotional Activities:
A staff member of a member institution's athletics depart-
ment may not be compensated by an individual or commer-
cial business outside of the institution for employment or
assistance in the production, distribution or sale of items
(e.g., calendars, pictures, posters, advertisements, cards)
bearing the names or pictures of student athletes. The use of
the names or pictures of student-athletes on promotional
items is limited to institutionally controlled activities involv-
ing the sale of official institutional publications and team or
individual pictures by the institution. This restriction shall
apply even if the promotional item is provided without
charge to the public by an outside individual or commercial
business that produces or purchases the item through the
assistance of institution's staff member.
8 3
j. Section 11.3.2.7, Compensation in Exchange for Use of
Merchandise:
Staff members of a member institution's athletics department
shall not accept, prior to receiving approval from the institu-
tion's chief executive officer, compensation or gratuities (ex-
cluding institutionally administered funds) from an athletics
shoe, apparel or equipment manufacturer in exchange for
the use of such merchandise during practice or competition
by the institution's student-athletes. 8
4
k. Section 11.3.2.8, Compensation for Scheduling Contests/In-
dividual Participation:
Staff members of a member institution's athletics depart-
ment shall not accept compensation or gratuities for sched-
uling athletics contests or individual meet participation with
another institution or a sponsor of athletics competition.
This specifically precludes the acceptance of compensation
or gratuities from other institutions, schedule brokers or
agents, and television networks or syndicators.8
82. 1991-92 NCAA DIvIsIoN I BYLAws, Art. 11.3.2.6.
83. Id. at 11.3.2.6.
84. Id. at 11.3.2.7.
85. Id. at 11.3.2.8.
1991]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
At the 1991 NCAA Convention, legislation was passed that would re-
quire Division I coaches to be certified on an annual basis in order to con-
tact or evaluate prospects off-campus.86 The certification procedures would
be established by the NCAA national office and be administered by the
respective conference offices. 7 The certification process would include a
standardized national test."8 The legislation would go into effect on August
1, 1992.89
Finally, the drafter should review the NCAA's "Recommended Policy
6" sections.90 Although these are not found in the NCAA Constitution or
By-Laws, these recommendations provide some guidance in what should be
included in a coaches employment agreement. The NCAA recommenda-
tions are as follows:
Section 1. An individual as well as an institution should recognize the
moral responsibilities inherent in respecting and fulfilling contractual
agreements.
Section 2. An institution should enter into a contractual agreement
with a coach similar to those entered into with the other members of the
faculty; and such a contract should include the assignment of faculty rank,
benefits of tenure and retirement, and such other rights and privileges as are
enjoyed by other members of the contracting institution's faculty.
Section 3. When a contracting institution makes special concessions to
a coach, they should be set forth in detail in the contract and accepted as
legal and binding in the same manner as the other provisions of the contrac-
tual agreement.
Section 4. All salary agreements between a coach and an institution
should be stated in the contract, and such salary should come from sources
under the administrative control of the institution.
Section 5. An educational institution seeking a coach who is under
contract to another educational institution is morally obligated first to con-
tact the institution that holds the agreement with the coach and secure per-
mission to negotiate with the individual.
Section 6. A coach should not enter into negotiations with a second
institution during the term of the contract without first notifying the institu-
tion that is a party to this contractual agreement, and the coach should then
86. Id. at 11.5.1.1.
87. rd. at 11.5.1.1.1.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 11.5.1.1.2.
90. J. ORLEANS & E. STONER, LEGAL ISSUES IN ATHLETICS 155 (2nd ed. 1989) (quoting
NCAA's "Recommended Policy 6").
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keep the first institution's administration informed concerning the
negotiations.
Section 7. No institution should engage the services of a coach prior to
the coach's release from any contractual obligation to another institution.91
An interpretation of Section 11.3.1 of the NCAA Manual "Control of
Employment and Salaries" 92 has had a recent affect on coaches. The rule
has now been interpreted to forbid a head coach from supplementing assis-
tant coaches' salaries. The rule states that, "The institution, as opposed to
any outside source, shall remain in control in determining who is to be its
employee and the amount of salary the employee is to receive within the
restrictions specified by NCAA legislation."93 The head coach for purposes
of this rule is considered an outside source.
Galen Hall, who resigned October 8, 1989, as head football coach at the
University of Florida, amid allegations of rule violations including paying
his assistant coaches extra money, may not have been the only college foot-
ball coach to pay his assistants.94 Hall, admitted at the time of his resigna-
tion that he paid $22,000.00 to two assistants.95 Former University of
Notre Dame coach Ara Parseghian and University of Oklahoma coach
Barry Switzer, admitted that they also supplemented their assistants' sala-
ries. "I will tell you right now, when I was at Notre Dame, I co-shared
income that I received," said Parseghian. "But that was after the fact. It
was commercial and television money I had received as a reward for our
success. I shared it at Christmas, as bonuses, with my assistant coaches."96
Switzer said he gave Christmas bonuses to secretaries and graduate assist-
ants when he was head coach at Oklahoma. 97 He also stated that he gave
former assistant Mack Brown, now head coach at North Carolina, a
$30,000 supplement when Brown was hired as the Sooners' offensive coor-
dinator in 1984.98 Florida State head football coach, Bobby Bowden, said
90% of coaches do not or did not know that rules existed forbidding the
coach from supplementing assistants' salaries.99
Don Morton, former University of Wisconsin head football coach, was
found by the NCAA to have violated its rules when he took out a loan in
91. Id.
92. 1991-1992 NCAA MANUAL DIVISION I BYLAWS, Art. 11.3.1.
93. Id.
94. The Sporting News, Oct. 23, 1989, at 56, col. -.
95. Id.
96. Chicago Tribune, Oct. 11, 1989, at 2C, col. -; Milw. J., Oct. 11, 1989, at -, col. -.
97. Id.
98. The Sporting News, Oct. 23, 1989, at 34, col.
99. L.A. Times, Oct. 12, 1989, at 9C, col. 1.
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August of 1989 in the amount of $14,100.00 to pay nine assistant coaches
their compensation for salary cuts ordered by the Wisconsin Athletic Board
as part of a budget balancing measure.'O° Morton received approval to in-
cur the loan to pay the coaches salaries from former Athletic Director Ade
Sponberg, who assumed that "outside sources" referred to non-university
sources such as boosters.101
E. The Knight Foundation Commission Report on Intercollegiate
Athletics
On March 19, 1991, The Knight Foundation Commission on Intercolle-
giate Athletics presented its forty-seven page report entitled "Keeping Faith
With the Student Athlete: A New Model for Intercollegiate Athletics."
The report issued by the twenty-two member Commission after more than
eighteen months of study and five hearings does deal with the issue of
coaches' athletic-related income. The Commission recommended as
follows:
The Commission believes that in considering non-coaching income
for its coaches, universities should follow a well-established practice
with all faculty members: If the outside income involves the univer-
sity's functions, facilities or name, contracts for particular services
should be negotiated with the university. As part of the effort to
bring athletics-related income into the university, we recommend
that the NCAA ban shoe and equipment contracts with individual
coaches. If a company is eager to have an institution's athletes using
its product, it should approach the institution not the coach.102
In addition, the Commission addressed the insecurity of the position of
coach and long-term contracts. The Commission recommended:
Academic tenure is not appropriate for most coaches, unless they
are bona fide members of the faculty. But greater security in an inse-
cure field is clearly reasonable. The Commission suggests that
within the first five years of contractual employment, head and assis-
tant coaches who meet the university's expectations, including its
academic expectations, should be offered renewable, long-term con-
tracts. These contracts should specifically address the university's
obligations in the event of termination, as well as the coach's obliga-
100. Wisconsin Not Likely to Pay for Mistake, United Press International, Feb. 15, 1990, at--;
U.S.A. Today, Oct. 25, 1989, at lIC, col. -.
101. Id.
102. THE KNIGHT FOUNDATION COMMISSION REPORT ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS,
Mar. 8, 1991, at 20.
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tions in the event he or she breaks the contract by leaving the
institution.1
0 3
The Commission recognized the great import and impact that the coach
has in their day-to-day contact with student-athletes:
You and your colleagues are the adults with the greatest day-to-day
contact with our student-athletes. You must make them understand
that fewer than one in a hundred will ever make a living from their
athletic ability. Emphasize to them the value of a college degree.
Insist that the privilege of being a member of your squad carries
with it the obligation of being a student in good standing. Search
out every opportunity to drive home the point that your athletes'
behavior, on and off the field, is important not merely because it
reflects on your institution or on you, but most significantly because
of what it says about them. Your satisfaction will be a lifetime asso-
ciated with adults who have, with your assistance, achieved their fullpotential.104
Rev. Theodore Hesburgh, President-Emeritus of the University of No-
tre Dame and co-chair of the Knight Foundation Commission on Intercol-
legiate Athletics indicated that:
"Power coaches, the CEOs of multimillion-dollar athletic enter-
prises, can become laws unto themselves."
"The surest path to reform lies in reaffirming the integrity of athlet-
ics as part of the educational enterprise."
"All funds spent and raised on sports will be under the control of the
university. .. "
"Shoe contract income will be negotiated through the university, not
with individual coaches."' 05
Rev. Theodore Hesburgh concludes that, "But only by restoring the bal-
ance between athletics and academics can we keep faith with the student-
athlete, with our institutions and with the American public that wants the
best for both of them."'10 6
F. State Open-Records Law
The representative of a coach or university should know the applicable
Open-Records law or Freedom of Information statute of the state where the
contract is situated. These laws are significant in that the coach may have
to allow access by the public to the financial details of his contract. The
103. Id. at 21.
104. Id. at 27.
105. The Sporting News, Mar. 25, 1991, at 6, col. 2.
106. Id. at 6, col. 4.
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confidentiality clause inserted in the contract by the lawyer for the univer-
sity or coach may be rendered ineffective by virtue of such laws. The un-
derlying public policy behind state open-records laws is to "insure
accountability of public officers and to enhance public confidence in the
political system through disclosure and increased awareness." 10 7
Three questions must be considered in order to decide whether the pub-
lic will be able to gain access to the coach's income reports or the coach's
contract itself. First, who may use a state's open-records law? Most state
laws provide that any person may request a disclosure of documents by an
agency; however, a minority of states require that the requester be a citizen
of that state. 
108
Second, what definition does the state's statute afford the term "public
records"? Implicit in any definition of "public records" is that the custodial
agency is a governmental agency or body. 9 Normally, state-funded col-
leges or universities are considered governmental bodies within the meaning
of state open-records laws."10 Some private entities may be subject to such
laws as a result of receipt of public funds and, as such, would qualify there-
for as governmental agencies. 11
Finally, what exemptions are allowed under the particular state open-
records law? The exemption most often found in state open records laws
that could pertain to a coaching employment contract would be the inva-
sion of privacy exemption. 2 Typically, statutes exempt personnel files,
medical files, and similar type fies the disclosure of which would constitute
an unwarranted invasion of privacy.113 If, however, the privacy exemption
does not specifically include the solicited document or information re-
quested, the courts often will balance the public's need to know against the
harm which might result in the invasion of privacy of the person to whom
the records relate. While a majority of laws allow the disclosure of elected
official's financial information and the financial information of public em-
ployees, it is not clear whether states may compel disclosure of a non-
elected public employee outside income, even if job related. 14
In June of 1988, Peter Gavitt resigned his position as head coach of the
University of Maine's women's basketball team. Gavitt's resignation lead
107. Note, supra note 26, at 503-05.
108. Id. at 505.
109. Id. at 506.
110. Id. at 507.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 507-08.
113. Id. at 508; see, eg., 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6) (1979).
114. Id.
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Gannett Publishing Company to make a series of requests for information
under the Maine Freedom of Access Act. The university denied all re-
quests and Gannett filed an action to compel the university to turn over
documents and records concerning Gavitt's resignation. "z' The university
contended that the Maine Freedom of Access Act contained two exceptions
to disclosure. There is a exception to disclosure for public employee's per-
sonnel records and "[m]edical information of any kind, including informa-
tion pertaining to diagnosis or treatment of mental or emotional disorders
.... ,6 There is also an exception for records containing complaints,
charges or accusations of misconduct that may result in disciplinary ac-
tion. 17 The university argued that these two exceptions mandated that the
settlement agreement between it and Gavitt should remain confidential.""
The court found, however, that there were several sentences in the settle-
ment agreement concerning medical information which should indeed re-
main confidential, but the remainder of the agreement should be
disclosed." 9
There is before the Georgia Supreme Court, a suit testing whether Geor-
gia's Open-Records Act requires coaches to make public documentation re-
garding their outside sources of income. 2 ° The Atlantic Journal -
Constitution newspaper petitioned the University of Georgia for release of
all documents detailing the athletically-related income of University of
Georgia, Football Coach and Athletic Director, Vince Dooley, Men's Bas-
ketball Coach, Hugh Durham and Women's Basketball Coach, Andy Land-
ers. The newspaper claims access to the memoranda under which the
coaches reported their income to University of Georgia's (UGA) President
Charles Knapp under the Georgia-Records Act. The coaches in order to
block release of documents detailing their income, filed suit against the
newspaper. The coaches contended that the documents are not "public
records" within the meaning of the Georgia Records Act as interpreted by
the case of Macon Telegraph v. Board of Regents.'2 ' In Macon, the Georgia
Supreme Court held that documents relating to the income and expenses of
the University of Georgia Athletic Association are "public records", be-
cause the Athletic Association is the management tool by which the Uni-
115. Gannett Publishing v. University of Maine, 555 A.2d 470 (Me. Ct. App. 1989).
116. Id. at 471.
117. Id at 472.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 473.
120. Note, supra note 26, at 511 (citing Durham and Landers v. Davidson & Cox Enterprise,
Inc. (Super. Ct. Fulton, Ga.) (filed January 1, 1989) (No. 55-1187)).
121. Note, supra note 26, at 511 (citing Macon Telegraph v. Board of Regents, 256 Ga. 443,
350 S.E.2d 23 (1986)).
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versity operates its intercollegiate athletic program. 2 2 However, the court
limited its decision by holding that records of the UGA are subject to dis-
closure only if "the maintenance of documents relating to... the intercolle-
giate sports program is an integral part" of the University President's
control of the school's intercollegiate sports program. 123 Ironically, the
coaches released figures detailing their athletically-related outside income to
the newspaper in January of 1988. However, the coaches refused to allow
inspection of the documentation with respect to such athletically-related
outside income. As a result, the primary issue in the lawsuit is the newspa-
per's right to inspect and copy certain of the coaches' documents, including
federal tax returns, communication with certified public accountants, per-
sonal checking accounts, endorsement contracts, letters between the
coaches and manufacturers and the forms the coaches used to report ver-
bally to their reporting superior.124
II. COACH'S EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT - CONTRACT
CLAUSES AND ISSUES
A. Introduction
As previously stated, there is no standard form coach's employment
contract, like standard players' contracts in the NBA, NFL, NHL or MLB.
A coach's contract can take the form of a simple letter agreement, standard
university appointment form or a negotiated contract. This section will dis-
cuss contract clauses and issues that are important to the coach's contract
from both the university and coach's perspective.
The environment in which some coaches' contracts are negotiated
should be understood. Newly appointed head coaches are often so elated to
get the "job" that, as long as the package number is respectable, they will
execute the proffered contract without the advice of counsel. Universities
"often negotiate coaching contracts in a frenzy, making impossible a careful
'invent-the-wheel' legal drafting job within the time constraints."'125 Fur-
ther, "the 'general' terms of university coaching contracts often are negoti-
ated by persons who lack knowledge of university's interests and how to
protect them."' 26 Consequently, lawyers become the beneficiaries of con-
tracts that have already been negotiated and drafted resulting in a contract
122. Id.
123. Id. (citing Macon Telegraph, 256 Ga. at 445, 350 S.E.2d at 25).
124. Id.
125. Stoner & Nogay, supra note 29, at 44.
126. Id.
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which fails to protect the parties' interests.'27 Because of the complexity of
the issues in today's coach's contract, those skilled in legal training and
knowledgable about the contractual provisions of coaching contracts should
be both involved in the negotiation and drafting process.
Edward N. Stoner II, in his speech at the 1987 National Association of
College and University Attorneys (NACUA), Section of Athletics', 27th
Annual Conference in Albuquerque, New Mexico, 128 proposed model
coaches contract in order to protect the university's interest. In an accom-
panying article prepared by Edward N. Stoner II and Arlie R. Nogay, de-
tails were laid out as to how university and college attorneys should
negotiate and draft college coaching contracts. 129
As the unions in the professional sports have negotiated the contract
language for their players, so too should the associations representing col-
lege football and basketball coaches. They should take a more active role
and interest in not only the format of their coaches contracts, but also the
economics of a coaches contract and what the coach and the representative
should be negotiating. A central and open source, such as a college coaches
contract data bank, should be made available to the attorneys representing
coaches so that a format of negotiation agenda and statistical information is
available to each representative.
What follows is a discussion of the various clauses and provisions that
are normally found in a college coach's contract, along with some specific
examples.
B. Duties and Responsibilities of the Coach.
Before a contract can be entered into listing the specific duties of the
coach, the coach must agree to devote his best efforts and full-time to the
performance of all duties and responsibilities attendant to the position of
head coach of that university's particular athletic team. Moreover, the
coach must agree to abide by and to comply with the constitution, bylaws
and interpretations of the NCAA and all NCAA, Conference and univer-
sity rules and regulations relating to the conduct and administration of that
particular athletic program. Beyond the general responsibilities and best
efforts clause, the employment contract will normally list specific responsi-
bilities. For example, a former Midwestern Collegiate Conference (MCC)
head basketball coach's contract lists the following specific responsibilities:
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Stoner & Nogay, supra note 29, at 44.
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A) Assume all of the support services that are necessary for coach-
ing the sport (For instance, recommend competitive schedule,
budget, necessary equipment, etc.);
B) Conduct the program with integrity and in a financially respon-
sible manner which reflects favorably upon the university as a
whole;
C) Maintain a level of performance in the program which is consis-
tent with the goals established by the University;
D) Provide for and encourage academic counseling for the stu-
dents-athletes coached by him within the program as their indi-
vidual circumstances may warrant;
E) Provide individual and group training and instruction to team
members at all practices;
F) Prepare for and accompany teams to both home and away com-
petitions;
G) Possess a thorough and up-to-date knowledge of the sport;
H) Assess talent of prospective students-athletes and recruit high
caliber prospects who are capable of performing effectively
against the University's scheduled opponents at the highest
Division One Level;
I) Answer all correspondence relative to the sport;
J) Be available for various community and alumni speaking
engagements;
K) Promote and stimulate interest in the program among students
and season ticket holders;
L) Hire and fire, but only after consultation with the University's
Director of Athletics, the Assistant Coaches for the Men's Var-
sity Basketball Program;
M) Work effectively with the media;
N) Perform related duties as assigned.1 30
Specific responsibilities listed in the MCC contract include:
A) Supervise assistant coaches, including compliance with such
coaches with - Conference and NCAA rules and
regulations;
B) Participate in the instruction and coaching of student-athletes;
C) Determine scouting schedules for high school and college games:
D) Interview prospective players, their parents and coaches;
E) Contact media, alumni and civic groups;
F) Work to integrate sports into the whole spectrum of academic
life to complement the University and its mission in the
community;
130. Provisions disclosed under condition name of Coach and University remain confidential.
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G) Work within the confines of rules, regulations, guidelines and
policies of the University athletic department;
H) Keep public statements complimentary to the athletic program
and to the University;
I) Make every effort, working in cooperation with and support of
the University's faculty and administrative officials, to ensure that
all student-athletes' academic requirements are met;
J) Have complete knowledge of the rules and regulations governing
intercollegiate athletic competition and maintain strict compli-
ance therewith by the program;
K) Apply effectively experience in recruiting, training and coaching
of student-athletes;
L) Be a disciplinarian but be fair, sympathetic and protective of stu-
dent-athletes while motivating them to excellence;
M) Maintain a mature and rational attitude, keep emotions in con-
trol and downplay defeats;
N) Prepare players for each game and each season with dedication;
and
0) Establish and maintain a frequent and systematic program of
personal communication with the University's student body.131
The university will want, in addition to a list of specific duties, a clause
indicating that the coach will perform such other duties as are incident and
consistent with his position and as may be prescribed from time-to-time by
mutual agreement between the parties. From the university's perspective, a
listing of specific duties is advantageous especially in attempting to enforce
the termination provisions for just cause, i.e., failure to perform the duties
and responsibilities specifically assigned.
On the other hand, the coach will probably desire a broad form respon-
sibility statement, such as "performance of such duties as are incidental to
the position and as may be prescribed from time-to-time by mutual agree-
ment between the parties" to give the coach an arguable position with re-
spect to the university's charge that the coach has failed to perform the
duties of the position.
C. Term of Employment
This clause normally creates a term that is for a stated number of years.
Coaching contracts are normally 3 to 5 years in length. Earle Bruce's, for-
mer head football coach at Ohio State University, employment contract
with respect to term provided: "Subject to the terms of this Agreement,
Earle Bruce is appointed by The Ohio State University ("University") to
131. Stoner & Nogay, supra note 29, at 59-60.
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the position of Head Football Coach ("Head Coach") for a term of three (3)
years commencing July 1, 1986, and terminating June 30, 1989. " 132
With respect to the term of employment, the MCC contract provides:
The Coach's employment hereunder shall commence , and
shall continue until this Agreement terminates on - provided
that this provision is subject to the terms and conditions of Article
VI hereof concerning termination and Article VII hereof concerning
restrictions on competition and neither party shall have any right to
terminate this Agreement prior to except as provided
therein. 133
The case of Roberts v. Wake Forest University 134 was an instructive case
with respect to the term of the employment contract. The plaintiff, Rob-
erts, was hired pursuant to an oral agreement to become the golf coach and
associate athletic director of Wake Forest University. There was an oral
agreement on salary, but there was no specific request as to a definite term
of employment.1 35 Golf coaches traditionally have a very long temre.136
The plaintiff understood from circumstances surrounding his initial visit to
the university that he would be given a reasonable amount of time to
demonstrate that he could coach the golf team. 137
Although the duration of his contract was not fixed, the plaintiff alleged
the parties intended employment to be for a substantial period, at least six
years.138 After less than a year with the program, the President of the Uni-
versity on December 2, 1977 requested plaintiff to relinquish his duties and
accept other duties in the athletic program.1 39
The North Carolina court indicated, "[e]mployment for an indefinite
term is regarded as an employment at will which may be terminated at any
time by either party."" 4 In this case, the court indicated that the record
falls far short of showing the intention of the parties for a fixed term of
employment.14 In addition, the plaintiff relied on the Wake Forest Univer-
sity Personnel Policies and Regulation Manual to support his argument
132. Coach Earl Bruce, Ohio State University, Football Contract.
133. Stoner & Nogay, supra note 29, at 59-60.
134. 55 N.C. App. 430, 286 S.E.2d 119 (1982).
135. Id. at 433, 286 S.E.2d at 122.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 435, 286 S.E.2d at 123.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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that he was a permanent employee and could not be dismissed without
cause. 1
42
Although the court admitted that the coach was a permanent employee,
at least pursuant to the manual, it did, however, indicate that a permanent
employee in a general sense means a position of some permanence as con-
trasted with a temporary employment and ordinarily, where there is no ad-
ditional expression as to duration, a contract for permanent employment
implies an indefinite hiring terminable at will. 43 The Roberts case is a clear
expression of the coaches' need to define in writing the term of his intended
employment contract, rather than let custom, usage, or the intentions of the
parties bind the pathway of the future term of employment.
Another interesting case with respect to the issue of term of employ-
ment is Lindsey v. University ofArizona.'4 In the spring of 1982, the Uni-
versity of Arizona attempted to locate a new coach for the Men's Basketball
Program. Ben Lindsey, who had successfully coached men's basketball at
Grand Canyon College for several years, was ultimately chosen. Lindsey
said that at a meeting with the Search Committee, the members therein
stated that no one would be hired for the coaching position for less than
three to four years.145 Lindsey also testified that during discussions with
the University of Arizona Athletic Director, Dave Strack, Lindsey was told
that it was the university's policy to give coaches a minimum of four years
before being evaluated.' 46 On July 6, 1982, Lindsey accepted a formal ap-
pointment as Adjunct Professor of Physical Education from 1982 to
1983.1' A coaching contract, in the form of a letter to Lindsey from the
then University of Arizona President, John P. Schaefer, stated:
Dear Mr. Lindsey:
You are requested to serve as Head Coach of Men's Basketball at
the University of Arizona, effective July 1, 1982 and ending no later
than June 30, 1983.
It is the policy of the Arizona Board of Regents that an aca-
demic-administrative assignment is not a contract and that it can be
terminated by the President of the University at any time.
It is also policy that the assignment is renewable at my option
and that renewal must be confirmed by a letter from my office. I
would appreciate it if you would sign the enclosed copy of the letter
142. Id. at 435-36, 286 S.E.2d at 124.
143. Id.
144. 157 Ariz. 48, 754 P.2d 1152 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
145. Id. at 50, 754 P.2d at 1154.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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to indicate your willingness to serve in this assignment. Please re-
turn it to Faculty Records (Administration 507) within ten days.
Sincerely
/a/ John P. Schaefer
JOHN P. SCHAEFFER' 4 8
Lindsey signed the bottom of a copy of the Schaefer letter on July 7,
1982.11" Above his signature and date he noted, "I hereby accept the fore-
going assignment." 150
Lindsey was to receive approximately $90,000 per year as compensa-
tion. " ' "This consisted of a $49,115 annual salary, approximately $30,000
per year arising from a contract with a shoe company which Lindsey pro-
moted, and an additional $10,000 anticipated from conducting a basketball
camp and other benefits associated with the position."1 52
After Lindsey was hired, the University men's basketball team exper-
ienced its worst record in history (4 wins and 24 losses). Sometime around
March 15, 1983, the new athletic director, Cedric Dempsey, notified Lind-
sey that his appointment would not be renewed after June 30, 1983.153 The
University provided Lindsey two checks totalling $49,115 as severance
pay.'5 4 Lindsey brought suit, alleging breach of contract, fraud, intentional
interference with contractual realations, and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.' 55
The jury awarded Lindsey $215,000 for deprivation of three years of
employment. 156
The appellate court indicated that:
Despite the specific language contained in the letter from President
Schaefer, Lindsey presented evidence from which the jury could
have concluded that he would have the security of coaching for four
years at the University of Arizona. An employer's oral representa-
tion may modify the terms of a contract and create a question of fact
for the jury as to the terms of the contract.' 57
148. Id.
149. Id. at 51, 754 P.2d at 1155.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 52, 754 P.2d at 1156.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 53, 754 P.2d 1157.
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The court found that the evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain a
verdict that the University breached an express contract with Lindsey by
terminating his employment before four years of employment elapsed.1 58
Implicit in this finding is the holding that Lindsey accepted a one year
renewable contract which the University promised to renew for three addi-
tional years.1 9 Thus, the appellate court, held that the University violated
an oral promise to renew Lindsey's contract for three additional years;
therefore, they affirmed the $215,000 trial court judgment.' 6
Obviously, oral promises inducing performance which may be in oppo-
sition to the stated letter of appointment were significant in the Lindsey
case. Discussions, promises, intentions, customs and usages, need to be-
come part of the written document so that there is no mistake with respect
to the term and conditions of employment.
D. "Rollover" Provisions
If the university is satisfied with the coach's performance after the com-
pletion of each season, the contract may be extended for an additional year
so that at all times the remaining term of the contract at the commence-
ment of each succeeding season is the same as the original term of the con-
tract. This is commonly referred to as a rollover clause. To illustrate,
Coach Jones has a five year contract with a rollover provision. At the end
of each season, the university, with Coach Jones' consent, has a right to
extend the contract an additional year, provided the university is pleased
with the performance of the coach. Thus, if the university continues to
exercise its rollover provision, Coach Jones will have at all times a five year
contract. Coach Jones may want the rollover provision to state that if the
university does not extend the contract for two consecutive years, the coach
has a right to terminate the contract without needing to comply with the
release or buy-out provision.
An example of a rollover contract provision suiting Coach Jones' needs
is as follows:
The term of this Agreement shall be for a period of five (5) years
commencing on April 1, 1989 and ending on March 31, 1994. In
addition thereto, the University shall have the right to extend the
term of this Agreement with the prior written approval of the Coach
for one (1) additional year following the completion of each Men's
Varsity Basketball season (but in no event later than May 1st of each
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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year) during the term of this Agreement. Upon the completion of
each season, the Coach will meet with the Athletic Director of the
University to review the season. Following such review, a decision
shall then be made by the Athletic Director whether or not to exer-
cise this one-year extension option for that year. In the event of a
decision to exercise such extension option, then the University shall
extend the term of this Agreement for an additional one (1) year in
accordance with such decision. If this extension option is not exer-
cised in a given year, however, but is exercised in a subsequent year
in the above-described manner, the University may in the event,
with the Coach's consent, increase the term of such subsequent ex-
tension to a full five (5) year period from the effective date of said
extension. In the event the term of the employment is not extended
by the University in any two (2) successive years, then the Coach
shall have the right to terminate his employment under and pursu-
ant to this Agreement without the necessity of complying with the
release provisions as more specifically described in paragraph 9.3
hereinafter.' 61
Such, a rollover clause has at least four drawbacks to the university.162
First, a university's notice of a decision not to extend the contract for the
extra year could be considered by some to be a current breach of the con-
tract which allegedly and immediately entitles the coach to x - 1 year's of
severance pay, or some other remedy. 163 Second, "[r]ollover clauses are
typically poorly drafted because drafters write them in the euphoria of the
moment.. ."I" Third, "[t]he rollover clauses require the university to give
years of notice of its intention to let the contract expire."' 65 Finally,
"[r]ollover clauses are typically one-sided. 66 While they bar the university
from removing the coach without paying for the balance of the term, con-
tracts with such clauses tend not to guarantee the university that the coach
will not terminate the agreement and coach elsewhere." 167
Some state institutions are prohibited from entering into contracts that
bind the institution for more than a period of one (1) year. Often times,
even though those contracts are only binding for one (1) year, there will be
an expression between the parties of an intent to continue the employment
161. Stoner & Nogay, supra note 29, at 47.
162. Id. at 48.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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relationship providing the terms of the original contract are met. An exam-
ple of such a clause is as follows:
The term of this Employment Agreement shall be for one (1) year,
commencing , , and terminating . The parties
hereby acknowledge that the University is an agency of the State of
and that the law of the State of prohibit the Univer-
sity from entering into legally binding agreements for periods longer
than one year. The parties also agree, however, that absent the oc-
currence of an event or events that would allow for termination of
this Agreement in accordance with the provisions set forth in Article
VI hereof or events beyond their control prohibiting such action, it
is their intent to enter into successive one-year Agreements on sub-
stantially the same terms and conditions as this Agreement for the
next - (- ) year(s).1 68
In The University of Arizona v. County of Pima,169 the University of
Arizona attempted to utilize a "fiscal out statute" to nullify contentions of
former University of Arizona head basketball coach, Ben Lindsey, that he
had an employment contract with the state for longer than one year dura-
tion. Arizona Revised Statute Section 35-154 provides as follows:
Unauthorized obligations, effect; liability
A. No person shall incur, order or vote for the incurrence of any
obligation against the state or for any expenditure not authorized by
an appropriation and an allocation. Any obligation incurred in con-
travention of this chapter shall not be binding upon the state and
shall be null and void and incapable of ratification by any executive
authority to give effect thereto against the state.
B. Every person incurring, or ordering or voting for the incurrence
of such obligations, and his bondsmen, shall be jointly and severally
liable therefor. Every payment made in violation of the provisions
of this chapter shall be deemed illegal, and every official authorizing
or approving such payment, or taking part therein, and every person
receiving such payment, or any part thereof, shall be jointly and sev-
erally liable to the state for the full amount so paid, or received. 170
This public statute is referred to as the "fiscal out statute". The court in
this case, however, interpreted the statute as to operate as a condition sub-
sequent, allowing the University of Arizona to avoid its obligations if pre-
requisite funding is not forthcoming. 1 ' "Subject to this implicit condition,
168. Id. at 63.
169. 150 Ariz. 184, 722 P.2d 352 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
170. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-154 (1986).
171. The University of Arizona v. County of Pima, 150 Ariz. 184, 187 722 P.2d 352, 355
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
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contracts for more than one year are valid and do not violate the statutory
provision against financial obligation for which there is no appropria-
tion." '172 While neither Arizona nor Lindsey had so pleaded, the court indi-
cated that it could take judicial notice of the fact that the University of
Arizona had maintained a men's basketball program after Lindsey's termi-
nation. 73 Legislative funding for Lindsey's position must necessarily have
been approved. 174 Thus, the court held that the University of Arizona was
not prevented from promising a basketball coach a four year period in
which to rebuild the basketball program by statutory provision even though
the legislature of the State of Arizona could avoid obligations of more than
one year if requisite funding was not forthcoming.
E. Reassignment Clause
A reassignment clause allows the university to remove a person as head
coach without terminating the employment contract by assigning the coach
to a new title and different duties. Often such a clause will contain a state-
ment that the coach is not to be assigned to any job which is not consistent
with his education and experience.
An example of a reassignment clause is found in Don Morton's (former
University of Wisconsin head football coach) contract. The clause is found
under the heading of "Title and Duties During Appointment Term". This
clause states that "During the Appointment Term, you shall hold the ap-
pointment title and duties of Head Coach in the University's football pro-
gram, except that at any time during the Appointment Term with 30 days
notice, the appointment title and duties as Head Coach may be terminated
and another title and duties assigned." '
If the coach refuses to accept such reassignment, the university may
attempt to terminate the contract pursuant to the termination provisions.
In essence then, the university wishes to avoid an accusation by the coach
that he was constructively discharged by such reassignment. The university
will want to shift the burden of refusing to accept reassignment to the coach
and such refusal to accept reassignment may be a just cause for the univer-
sity to terminate the employment contract and, thus, limit the university's
liability for liquidated damages. Careful drafting of reassignment clauses
must be undertaken to protect the university.. Any language as contained in
the contract which gives the coach the apparent right to be the "Head
172. Id. at 187, 188, 722 P.2d at 355, 356.
173. Id. at 188, 722 P.2d at 356.
174. Id.
175. Former coach Don Morton, University of Wisconsin, Football Contract.
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Coach" during the term of the contract should be avoided. Such language
could result in the coach bringing a suit for injunctive relief for the right to
continue as head coach for the balance of the term of the contract. The
coach could also contend that reassignment is, in legal fact, a constructive
discharge, thus, entitling the coach to perform no duties at all and get paid
pursuant to the terms of the contract. 176 There is case law in an employ-
ment context 177 that would conclude that when a coach contracts to fill a
particular position, any material change in duties or significant reduction in
rank could constitute a constructive discharge which, if found unjustified, is
a breach of the contract. The fact that the coach receives the same salary is
immaterial because the status associated with the original position may well
have been the primary inducement for making the contract. 178
To ensure maximum protection, the attorney for the head coach will
seek a prohibition against reassignment in the employment contract. An
example of a clause prohibiting reassignment is as follows:
It is hereby acknowledged by the university that the position in
which the coach is hired is unique and requires special talents. The
position as herein specified in this agreement is the only position for
which the coach is hereby being employed. The university shall
have no right pursuant to this agreement to reassign the coach to
any other position of employment for the university during the term
of this employment or any renewal therefor.'
79
Another issue which needs to be defined in any reassignment clause is
the compensation that the coach will receive in the newly assigned position,
if accepted. For instance, does the coach receive only the guaranteed base
salary plus university fringe benefits, or does the coach also receive those
other compensation perquisites that are normally associated with the posi-
tion of head coach?
More recently, the presence of a reassignment clause in a coach's con-
tract has been used by the university as leverage with respect to a buy out of
the remaining term of the contract. Essentially, the university will reassign
the coach. There will be some confusion or conflict with respect to the
salary, fringe benefits and other compensation perquisites available to the
coach by virtue of the reassignment. This will eventually lead to a negoti-
ated settlement between the coach and the university with the university
using the reassignment clause as leverage in such negotiations. For exam-
176. Stoner, supra note 30, at 4.
177. Id.
178. Id. (quoting Brock v. Mutual Reports, Inc., 397 A.2d 149 (D.C. App. 1979).
179. Clause utilized in undisclosed and confidential coaching conrtacts drafted by M.
Greenberg.
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ple, Don Morton, former head football coach of the University of Wiscon-
sin, did not bring football fortunes to the University. Morton was
reassigned, pursuant to his contract, from the position of head coach to the
position of assistant athletic director in the third year of his five year
contract. s°
The issue in the Morton case was not the reassignment clause, but the
compensation that Morton would receive for the remaining two years of his
contract. The University agreed that Morton had a right to his salary, Uni-
versity fringe benefits, plus a car and country club membership."' Morton,
however, demanded the additional outside income, i.e., his radio and televi-
sion shows and summer camps that were directly a result of his position of
head coach.I82 Although the parties battled their differences in the newspa-
pers, and a lawsuit was Morton's game play, the parties eventually settled
their differences with the University buying out the contract and Morton
terminating his employment. 83
F. Compensation Clauses
Compensation clauses address the monetary aspects of a coaching con-
tract. Unfortunately, parties often believe that what one side gains, the
other side loses, causing each side to maintain rigid negotiating postures in
order to ensure that their interests are protected. However, benefits can be
realized by both sides since the success of one party can often benefit the
other. For instance, a clause granting a coach autonomy in running his
own television and radio show may produce a more aggressive and quality
program since the coach is directly interested. This in turn may produce
higher viewership, greater fan interest and ultimately higher ticket sales.
Therefore, it is important to focus on the beneficial aspects of compensation
clauses of both sides to objectively realize their true impact upon the
contract.
1. Guaranteed Base Salary
The first clause normally considered in every coaching contract is the
guaranteed base salary (GBS). Simply put, this clause states the amount of
money the institution employing the coach's services is willing to pay. An
example follows:
180. Milw. J., Nov. 29, 1989, at IA, col. 1; Milwaukee Sentinel, Dec. 12, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. Morton's Ultimate settlement was for $300,000, see also The Boston Globe, Dec. 22,
1989, at 34C, col. -.
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The guaranteed base salary paid by the University to the coach for
services and satisfactory performance under the terms and condi-
tions of this Employment Agreement shall be at the rate of $-
per year, payable in - installments by the University to the
Coach on the - day of each calendar month during the term of this
Agreement. 184
The university may be faced with various limitations as to the extent of
such salary in the sense that the coach is no more or less an employee of the
university than any other university professor. Therefore, the salary
granted a coach is scrutinized and must be justified in light of other
coaches' salaries and in the interest of preserving the university's emphasis
upon its academic purpose. Even so, many coaches nonetheless retain
healthy base salaries despite concerns over the school's academic prestige.
Many universities believe a top-rated coach should be compensated as well
as a top-rated university professor.
What follows are some sample estimated base salaries for head or for-
mer head football and basketball coaches from various Division I schools as
reported by the news media (the figures as herein expressed have not been
verified or corroborated as being true or correct):
SCHOOL COACH BASE SALARY
Georgia Tech Bobby Cremins $ 95,000185
Georgia Hugh Durham 75,000186
Arizona Lute Olsen 130,000187
Florida Norm Sloan 99,00188
Kentucky Rick Pitino 105,000189
Wisconsin Barry Alvarez 135,000190
Ohio State Earle Bruce 87,120191
UNLV Jim Strong 100,000192
Florida Lon Kruger 110,000193
NC State Les Robinson 95,000194
The employment contract should also direct its attention, presuming
that the coach's contract is long-term in nature, to periodic increases in the
184. Stoner & Nogay, supra note 29, at 63-64.
185. Palm Beach Post, Apr. 30, 1989, at 8C, col. -.
186. Id.
187. USA Today, Apr. 13, 1989 at IC, col. 3.
188. Id.
189. Kirkpatrick, The Blue Grass Isn't So Blue, SPORTs ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 11, 1989, at 54.
190. Sports Industry News, January 5, 1991, at 9.
191. The Mystery of Earle Bruce, L.A. Times, Jan. 17, 1988, Part 3, at 3, col. 2.
192. UNLVPicks Notre Dame Assistant, L.A. Times, Dec. 23, 1989, at 2C, col. 1.
193. N.Y. Times, May 2, 1990, at B4, col. 4.
194. Sporting News, May 7, 1990, at 37.
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GBS during the contract term. In essence, the coach will be entitled to
merit increases based upon periodic evaluations. Normally, merit increases
based on periodic evaluations will occur on the same basis as evaluations
and increases available to other university coaches within the coach's em-
ployment classification. In some instances, the coach, depending upon his
leverage, will want to negotiate a guaranteed minimum base increase. The
following example illustrates this point:
The coach should be eligible to be paid a merit increase or raise,
which raise shall be determined by using the same procedures for
evaluating and rewarding meritorious performance as used for other
coaches of the coach's classification within the university system.
Provided, however, that in no event shall the merit increase during
each year during the term of this employment agreement be less
than 5% of the previous year's GBS. a95
Some coaches's contracts will contain conditional compensation clauses
subject to approval of the university's budget and appropriations. This
clause will normally indicate that payment of the compensation as set forth
in the contract is subject to approval of annual operating budgets by the
university's governing body and appropriations of sufficient funds to pay
the coach's compensation. An example of such a clause is as follows:
The payment of all forms of compensation set forth in this agree-
ment is subject to the approval of the annual operating budget by the
university's governing body, and the sufficiency of appropriations or
the availability of sufficient funds within the athletic department's
budget to pay such compensation.1 96
2. Fringe Benefits
The employment contract will also contain a provision for fringe bene-
fits. Normally, the coach will be entitled to the standard university fringe
benefits appropriate to the coach's university employment classification in-
cluding but not limited to group life insurance, health insurance, vacation
with pay, TIAA/CREF, etc. In addition, there will be a provision covering
reimbursement for expenses including all travel and out-of-pocket expenses
reasonably incurred for the purposes of and in connection with the perform-
ance of the coach's duties. Reimbursement of expenses are normally made
pursuant to and in accordance with standard procedures of the university
upon presentation of vouchers or other statements itemizing such expenses
in reasonable detail. The university, as additional compensation, may pro-
195. See supra note 179.
196. Stoner & Nogay, supra note 29, at 89.
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vide the coach with the use of an automobile during the term of the employ-
ment contract. If the university provides a coach with an automobile, there
should be a periodic auto replacement provision and a provision for the use
of a university provided gasoline credit card. Finally, the university should
provide comprehensive liability insurance and be responsible for all costs of
maintenance and repair with respect to the subject automobile.
Other forms of fringe benefits may be offered to the coach depending
upon his contractual leverage including tuition waivers for his immediate
family members, season and complimentary tickets to each of the univer-
sity's team games including post-season games and tournaments, club mem-
berships to either golf, country club or health club facilities and living
accommodations to name a few. For example, Jerry Tarkanian, Head
Men's Basketball Coach of the University of Nevada at Las Vegas is alleged
to receive as a fringe benefit 234 season basketball tickets (with a face value
of over $40,000) for the coach to dispose of at his will.197 Joe B. Hall,
former Head Men's Basketball Coach of the University of Kentucky was
alleged to have received more than 322 complimentary tickets and at one
point faced criminal charges for selling those tickets for more than face
value, i.e., scalping. 198
Clemson provided former head football coach Danny Ford with a home
and made payment on his $280,000 home mortgage for him. !9 9 Auburn
head football coach, Pat Dye, lives rent-free in a $500,000 house.2°0 Both
head football and men's basketball coaches at the University of Arkansas
have $10,000 housing allowances." 1 When Jackie Sherrill signed his Texas
A&M contract he was promised as much as $75,000 toward the purchase of
a new home.20 2 When John Thompson considered leaving Georgetown for
a coaching position at the University of Oklahoma, a group of Georgetown
alumni purchased a $300,000 house in the District of Columbia donating
the same to the University with the proviso that Thompson be allowed to
live in it for as long as he remains at Georgetown.2 °3 He pays rent,
although no one will reveal how much.2 4
It is extremely important for both the coach and the university to specif-
ically list every fringe benefit provided as part of the employment relation-
197. M. SPERBEIR, supra note 5, at 177.
198. Id at 178.
199. Id. at 196.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 196, 197.
203. Gellitt, The Gospel According to John, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec., 1980 at 90, 102.
204. Id.
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ship to avoid any future assertion by the coach of any assumed fringe
benefit not listed in the contractual arrangement.
3. Moving - Relocation Expense Allowance
The coach is bound to incur expenses in his move from his old employ-
ment to his new coaching position. The coaches' representative may want
to negotiate for a moving - relocation expense allowance. The allowance
should cover some, if not all, of the following moving related expenses:
house hunting expenses, travel expenses, expenses for moving household
goods and personal affects, including packing, storage and insurance, tem-
porary lodging, extraordinary costs incurred to dispose of former residence,
such as a mortgage prepayment penalty, costs incurred in the buy out of an
existing leasehold obligation, and costs such as attorney fees, commissions
or other expenses incurred in the purchase of the new residence, etc. The
contractual clause should either cap out the total amount of dollars that the
university is willing to expend on such allowance or specifically list without
limit those expenses for which the moving-relocation expense allowance
applies.
4. Bonuses
Bonus clauses in employment contracts are in the nature of supplemen-
tal compensation as an incentive based upon a coach's performance. These
incentives may come in the form of a predetermined set amount or in the
form of percentages of either the coach's base salary or of the net revenues
received by the university as a result of post-season play. What follows is a
listing of some bonus types:
1. Signing bonus. (Execution of original employment contract or re-
newal contract)
2. Participation in post-season tournaments or Bowl games
3. Regular season win/loss record
4. Regular season or conference championship
5. End of year conference championship tournament
6. Home game attendance
7. Graduation rates or grade attainment levels
8. Length of service based on years of employment (annuity)
Lon Kruger, head basketball coach at the University of Florida, will
earn a $1,000.00 bonus if 40% of his scholarship players graduate and
$2,000.00 bonus if 50% of his scholarship players graduate. 20° He will gain
205. Sports Industry News, June 1, 1990, at 165.
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an extra month's salary in any year that 60% of his scholarship players
earn their degree.20 6
Bill Frieder, head basketball coach of Arizona State University can earn
up to $14,000.00 for winning the NCAA Tournament, $10,000.00 for im-
proving the academic performance of his players and $30,000.00 if season
home attendance exceeds 11,000.207
Lute Olsen, head basketball coach of the University of Arizona, has per-
formance bonus clauses in his contract which could earn him an additional
$33,000.00 per year.208 These clauses are triggered if the team goes to the
Final Four and if players achieve a specified academic performance. 9
Jerry Tarkanian, by virtue of taking his team into the 1990 Final Four,
earned 10% of the team's net revenue for its appearance. 210 Since each
team in the Final Four earned approximately $1,432,500.00, Tarkanian can
expect to receive $143,250.00 in addition to his regular salary.211
The popular coach will be in demand for personal appearances and
speaking engagements by local and national alumni and booster groups.
The coach and university will normally negotiate a specific number of ap-
pearances to be made by the coach as part of his salary compensation pack-
age. Appearances over and above the base minimum should result in the
coach being compensated in the form of additional compensation or bonus.
A sample clause is as follows:
As part of the compensation as hereinstated, coach shall be required
to participate in at least - alumni-booster personal appearances or
speaking engagements. The university shall be responsible for incur-
ring all expenses with respect to the making of such speeches or ap-
pearances. In the event that in any contract year the coach is
required to make in excess of the minimum amount of personal ap-
pearances or speaking engagements as required herein, coach shall
receive as additional compensation, $- per speaking engagement
or public appearance. This paragraph shall not in any way prohibit
the coach from separately entering into agreements or making public
appearances on his own behalf and not for the university wherein
the coach is compensated from a third party other than the univer-
206. Id.
207. Sports Industry News, Mar. 24, 1989, at Data Page.
208. U.S.A. Today, Apr. 13, 1989, at Cl, col. 3.
209. Id.
210. N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1990 at 6, col. 2.
211. Id. With an annual base salary of $203,976, Tarkanian is Nevada's highest paid State
employee, Milw. J., June 5, 1991 at C5, col. -.
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sity, all as provided by the outside employment provisions of this
contract.212
5. Additional Retirement Benefits
Retirement benefits separate from the university's fringe benefits in the
form of an annuity seems to be popular today in college coaching. Such
benefits are used as additional incentives for the coach, not only in recogni-
tion of his accomplishments, but in hope of retaining the coach for the full
term of his contract. There are two methods for providing additional retire-
ment benefits.2 1 Under the first method, the university can purchase an
annuity which the coach owns. As the university pays premiums, the coach
includes those premiums in income. 2 14 The advantage for the coach is that,
the earnings are tax deferred until they are withdrawn.2 15 The advantage of
annuities are that if the interest or earnings are allowed to compound on a
tax deferred basis, there can be a substantial increase in the net worth of the
annuity in a very short period of time.21 6 Annuities are normally purchased
through insurance companies and take on such form as straight or life an-
nuity, joint and survivorship annuity, refund annuity, deferred annuity and
variable annuity to name a few. It is suggested that the coach seek assist-
ance of not only a financial advisor, but a life insurance agent when at-
tempting to structure an annuity that most perfectly fits his economic and
retirement situation.
Under the second method, the university agrees to pay a retirement ben-
efit as deferred compensation.217 The university can use a commercial an-
nuity to accumulate funds to pay the deferred compensation benefits, but
the annuity must be owned by the university and the retirement benefits are
paid by the university. 218 There are special income tax considerations that
must be kept in mind when negotiating deferred compensation for univer-
sity coaches.219 Section 457 of the Internal Revenue Code imposes limita-
tions on the amount that an employee of a tax-exempt organization can
defer under a nonqualified deferred compensation plan.2 0 As a general
rule, an employee of a tax-exempt organization, such as a university, will be
212. See supra note 179.
213. Interview with John K. O'Meara, Assistant Director Advanced Marketing, Northwest-
ern Mutual, May 20, 1991.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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taxed on any amount he defers if the "amount of compensation deferred"
exceeds $7500.221 While the rule is defined in terms of the amount that the
employee actually defers, the Internal Revenue Service has taken the posi-
tion that the limitations of section 457 also apply to nonqualified retirement
plans that do not involve elective deferrals by the employee." z Conse-
quently, additional retirement benefits provided as an incentive would be
includible in the coach's income currently if the section 457 limit is ex-
ceeded.223 Presumably, in cases where the coach does not actually defer
current compensation but rather the university agrees to pay an additional
retirement benefit, the "amount of compensation deferred" would be deter-
mined by calculating the present value today of the benefit that is promised
in the future." 4 In those situations where the university agrees to set aside
a specified amount for the benefit of the coach, the amount set aside would
be the "amount of compensation deferred"." 5 The limits imposed by sec-
tion 457 can be exceeded without targeting current taxation on the deferred
amount if there is a substantial risk of forfeiture on the right to receive the
benefits.226 Section 457 defines substantial risk of forfeiture as a condition
requiring the future performance of substantial services by an individual.' 7
In a case where the university wants to provide a substantial nonqualified
retirement benefit, taxation of the promised benefit can be postponed until
retirement if the right of the coach to receive the benefit is conditioned on
his continuing to perform services for the university until the time when
benefits are due." 8 Since it is not likely that the coach will provide substan-
tial services after retirement, the risk of forfeiture will lapse and the coach
will be taxed on the present value of the future benefits or the value of the
account set aside for his benefit at the time he retires." 9 Because of the
acceleration of the income tax, it is necessary to structure the payments so
that there is a balloon payment at retirement so that the coach can pay the
tax and still receive the retirement income desired. 30 As subsequent pay-
ments are made, a portion of the payment will be tax-free to the coach as
representing the amount on which he already paid tax.231
221. Id.
222. Id. (citing Internal Revenue Notice 87.13, 1987-1 C.B. 432, QSA 26 (1991)).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 457(f) (1991)).
227. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 457(f)(3)(b) (1991)).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 457(f)(1)(B) (1991)).
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Pat Dye's, head football coach of Auburn University, financial package
will be augmented by a retirement plan including an annuity with $1 mil-
lion at age 65.232 Nolan Richardson, whose Arkansas basketball team
made the 1990 Final Four, has obtained a $1 million annuity to make cer-
tain of his stay at Arkansas.233 Xavier University is alleged to have given
basketball coach Pete Gillen an annuity or insurance policy worth $1 mil-
lion after he rejected overtures to fill the coaching vacancy at Virginia.2 4
Denny Crum, the Head Men's Basketball Coach at the University of Louis-
ville will obtain a lump sum payment of $1 million in 1993, if he fulfills the
obligations of his long-term contract with the school.235 An example of an
annuity or endowment fund clause is as follows:
In recognition of the contribution by coach to the university's ath-
letic program in general and to the basketball program in particular,
the university shall establish a special endowment fund and on Au-
gust 31st of each year during the term of this Agreement, the univer-
sity shall deposit the sum of $100,000 to the fund from gifts and/or
grants received for athletic purposes. The payments, as to principal
made to this fund as well interest as all capital appreciation realized
within the fund shall be fully vested in coach.
The total value of the fund shall be determined as of August 31,
1995 and subsequently paid to coach within 120 days thereafter pur-
suant to a withdrawal program mutually agreeable to the coach and
the university. In the event of coach's death prior to August 31,
1995, the university shall be obligated to continue to make such
principal payments to said fund and the total value of such fund as
of August 31, 1995 shall then be paid within 120 days thereof to
coach's surviving spouse or designee pursuant to withdrawal pro-
gram mutually agreeable to said surviving spouse or designee pursu-
ant to a withdrawal program mutually agreeable to said surviving
spouse or designee and the university.236
232. M. SPERBER, supra note 5, at 194.
233. The Washington Post, Apr. 3, 1990, at B5, col. 2.
234. The Sporting News, Apr. 16, 1990, at 29.
235. M. SPERBER, supra note 5, at 194. Sperber stated that an
Increasing number of schools are using future bonuses and annuities as an attempt to in-
sure that a coach will not jump contract for another job. In Crum's case, the promised $1
million appears to have kept him from accepting various attractive coaching offers, includ-
ing one from UCLA, his alma mater. This use of future annuities as a defensive strategy
against the Coach in Motion Play also contradicts the standard coaches' complaint that
schools are ready to fire them after the first losing season.
236. See supra note 179.
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G. Provisions Concerning Outside or Supplemental Income Sources
Contrary to popular belief, a successful coach's life-style is not condu-
cive to long vacations, lazy afternoons during the off-season and three hours
of fun and excitement on game day during the season. The majority of the
successful coaches are either on the road recruiting or in the film room
strategizing and/or performing the multitude of duties of what could be a
24-hour a day job. Equally misconceived is the notion that all college
coaches earn top salaries. Again, the majority earn only modest incomes.
For this reason, there exist clauses within the framework of the contract
which provide coaches with the opportunity to supplement their income
through outside sources. Outside income significantly affects the economics
of high visibility college sports. Coaches of successful football and basket-
ball programs often make more money from outside income than they do
from their base salaries which may be restricted either by law or budgetary
limitations.
Generally, the university will require that certain requisite conditions be
followed by the coach prior to engaging in any outside business or en-
trepreneurial endeavor. First, and foremost, the university will require that
its interest and the obligations owed to it by the coach remain primary.
This is based on the fiduciary relationship between the university and the
coach and the duty of loyalty owed by each to the other. This covenant is
an attempt to avoid inferior performance in the coach's duties resulting
from conflicts of interest and compromises.
Secondly, the coach is subject to all NCAA rules regulating the coach's
sources of income. In this way, the coach's independent judgment cannot
be persuaded by outside interest groups.
Thirdly, the university will normally retain the right of final approval
before the coach is allowed to enter into such agreements. However, the
university's right of approval may not be used to unreasonably deny the
coach's justifiable request or income expectancies.
The coach may or may not retain all of the proceeds which result from
outside sources. Whether the income is the university's or the coach's
should be specifically designated in the contract. Presumably, if the coach
acts independent of the university, he will retain the proceeds from such
outside sources. If, on the other hand, the university supplies the means or
personnel to assist the coach, it may require a certain percentage of the
proceeds or a predetermined fee.
The university will also want a statement that such outside employment
is independent of the university's employment and the university will have
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no responsibility or liability for any claims arising from the performance
therefrom. An example of an outside employment clause is as follows:
Coach shall devote such time, attention and efforts as necessary to
fulfill the duties under and pursuant to this Agreement and shall not
become associated directly or indirectly in any "other business or
employment" without first obtaining the prior written consent of the
University, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. For
purposes of this provision, Coach's participation in speaking engage-
ments and personal appearances, coaches clinics, basketball camps,
radio and T.V. appearances other than those to be compensated pur-
suant to this Agreement, and athletic shoe, apparel and equipment
endorsement contracts shall not be deemed, for purposes of this
Agreement, to be "other business or employment" requiring the
consent of the University. Coach shall schedule such activities so as
not to interfere with his responsibilities hereunder. It is hereby fur-
ther understood and acknowledged by the University that any com-
pensation received by Coach with respect to permitted "other
business or employment" shall be the sole compensation of the
Coach hereunder.237
1. Radio and Television
Common to any sporting organization is the media attention it attracts.
Radio and television talk show programs featuring the coach offering direct
contact between the coach and the fans are a lucrative source of income for
coaches.
There are various alternatives as to how these radio and television show
contracts are structured and negotiated. First, the coach may negotiate in-
dependent of the university with a radio or television station. The coach
would receive the compensation from such show with the university not
being responsible for any amounts due and owing under such agreement. A
second alternative is where the university has an agreement with a particu-
lar radio or television broadcaster for the production of a show in conjunc-
tion with its athletic program. The coach is paid directly by the media
representative. The coach in these instances should require a minimum dol-
lar guarantee with respect to such shows each year.
Another alternative is where the university itself owns all rights to the
program and controls the production and marketing. The coach may be
required under, such university controlled and produced shows to assist in
procuring sponsors and to make commercial endorsements on behalf of
program sponsors. The coach will normally participate in the financial suc-
237. Id.
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cess of such university program on a negotiated basis. If the university con-
trols production and marketing of its television and radio programming, it
may require the coach not to appear in any competing radio or television
program during the season except routine news media interviews.
While the structuring of radio and television deals make take different
formats, some coaches are alleged to enjoy enormous profits from their en-
terprises. When Bill Dooley was football coach at Virginia Tech, he was
paid a talent fee by the school for appearing on television and radio shows
for an estimated $85,000.33 When Jackie Sherrill was at Texas A&M it
was alleged that he received at least $135,000 a year from the sponsors of
his television and radio shows.239 In Sherrill's case and in similar deals,
many of the sponsors are athletic department boosters who see the pay-
ments as a way of helping their favorite athletic programs. However, spon-
sors-boosters can write-off the money spent as a deductible business expense
(part of their company's advertising). 24°
2. Endorsements
As a result of their high public profile and stature, coaches may often
times attract product or organizational endorsement offers, especially if the
coach is enjoying enormous popularity among boosters and the public. Ba-
sically, three important ingredients can combine to create a marketable
coach: (1) Television or media exposure; (2) a creative personality; and,
(3) a big win.24 Typically, the university will require that the coach not
utilize his university association with any product endorsement. However,
the coach will require that he be permitted to identify himself as the coach
of the particular athletic team.
Former North Carolina State head basketball coach, Jim Valvano, is a
prime example of how endorsements can be utilized to create a lucrative
supplemental income. After his team won the NCAA national basketball
championship in 1983, Valvano was hailed as one of the top-rated coaches
and strategists in the game. His reputation as a colorful speaker and unique
personality soared, and his comfort in front of a camera all combined to
make him an endorsement gold mine. As a result, Valvano came out with
his own line of clothes called Coach "V's", authored an Italian cookbook
238. Id. at 186.
239. Id. at 187.
240. Id.
241. Comte, Coaches for Sale, Sports Inc., Apr. 18, 1988, at 40. Comte states: "Athletes
aren't the only sports figures who can make big endorsement dollars. Madison Avenue has its eye
on college coaches, especially those with personality, TV exposure and most importantly, a big
win."
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and served as spokesman for Ronzoni Pasta.242 This was in addition to the
numerous other product endorsements, (car companies, Washington Speak-
ers Bureau, corporate art, etc.) which allegedly earned him as much as
$750,000.00 a year.24 3
3. Shoe, Apparel and Equipment Contracts
Shoe contracts are generally negotiated between the coach and the shoe
company. In most cases, the company will pay the coach a certain sum of
money as a consultant and provide a supply of shoes, warm-up togs and
gym bags in exchange for the coach's team players wearing the shoes. The
benefits are readily apparent to the shoe company in that high profile teams
advertise their product during every game. At almost every major col-
legiate program, a shoe company contracts to have its shoes worn by the
coach and team members. When considering the hundreds of thousands of
dollars television broadcasters are demanding for 30 second commercial
slots, $100,000 for 25 games at 40 minutes a game is a bargain. In a typical
shoe contract provision, the coach will want the university's agreement that
the coach may require the athletic team to wear the shoes during competi-
tion. In addition, the coach will also want the university to consent that he
may be permitted to wear, promote, endorse or consult with the shoe, ap-
parel or equipment manufacturer concerning the design or marketing of
242. B. Jacobs, Endorsements: Coaching For Dollars, Sports Inc., Feb. 8, 1988, at 42.
243. Id.; "One Man's Enterprise": North Carolina State head coach, Jim Valvano's outside
income:
-Four-year shoe endorsement contract with Nike at more than $100,000 a year.
-Three-year contract to serve as spokesman for a Durham, N.C., Nissan Dealership.
-Contract with the Washington Speakers Bureau for a guaranteed 25 appearances at
$8,500 per appearance ($212,500).
-Endorsement contract with a national insurance company (pending).
-Host of Jim Valvano's Road to the Final Four, airing on New York's MSG Network and
SportsChannel.
-Pilot episode of another national sports show.
-Host of the Jim Valvano Show, which airs on six network affiliates in North Carolina,
ESPN, Home Team Sports, Dimension Cable in Arizona and Sportsvision in Chicago.
-Jim Valvano Basketball Camps on the North Carolina State campus.
-Four-year contract with Capitol Broadcasting in Raleigh, N.C., for personal services and
appearances on radio and television shows.
-Half-owner of Center-Vitale, a subsidiary of JTV enterprises, which creates corporate art.
Among the life-size statutes already commissioned are one of Aristides, the first winner of
the Kentucky Derby, for Churchill Downs; one of Julius Erving for the Spectrum in
Philadelphia; and one of Walter Payton that will be given to the city of Philadelphia; and
one of Walter Payton that will be given to the city of Chicago. Miniatures of the origi-
nals are made and sold for ;up to $2,000 each. Source: JTV Enterprises.
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such shoe, apparel or equipment without such activities being in violation of
the employment agreement.
Mark Thomasshaw, corporate counsel for the Nike Shoe Company,
states that the four or five top college basketball coaches in the country can
earn as much as $200,000 apiece to sign endorsement contracts with shoe
companies. Others in the top ten can expect between $100,000 and
$200,000.24 The Nike Shoe Company has about 60 major college coaches
under contract.245 Converse has 41 coaches under contract and Reebok's
roster includes 26 coaches.246 For example, it has been reported that John
Thompson (Georgetown) received $200,000.00 annually, Eddie Sutton (for-
merly of the University of Kentucky) received $160,000.00 annually, Jim
Valvano (formerly of North Carolina State) received $160,000.00 annually,
Jerry Tarkanian (University of Nevada Las Vegas) received $120,000.00 an-
nually, and Jim Boeheim (Syracuse University) received $120,000.00 annu-
ally.247 It has also been reported that Bobby Cremins, head basketball
coach of Georgia Tech, first shoe contract with Converse paid him
$5,000.00 in 1981.24 After winning the 1984-85 Atlantic Coast Champion-
ship, Converse signed Cremins to a four year contract at $70,000.00 per
year.2 49 In 1989, he signed a multi-year contract with Nike for $160,000
per year. 250
Below the six figure echelon, at least 75 NCAA Division I Men's Bas-
ketball head coaches have contracts in the $40,000 or higher range and the
leading women's head coaches average $10,000 a year. 51
Sporting News in its February 4, 1991 issue reported the top shoe deals
for college basketball head coaches for the 1991 season from information
obtained from the Newport News Daily Press:
244. D. HOFMANN & M. GREENBERG, SPORTS Biz 101, 102 (1989).
245. Id. at 102.
246. Kirkpatrick, The Old Soft Shoe, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 16, 1988, at 98.
247. M. SPERBER, supra note 5, at 184.
248. Kirkpatrick, supra note 246, at 98.
249. Socking Away 160,000 in Shoe Deal, Sporting News, Feb. 1, 1988.
250. Id.
251. M. SPERBER, supra note 5, at 184.
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SHOE COMPANIES
ToP SHOE DEALS FOR COLLEGE AND BASKETBALL COACHES:
No. Coach Team Company Per Year
1 Dale Brown LSU L.A. Gear $300,C00
2 Mike Krzzewski Duke Adidas $260,COO
3 Bob Knight Indiana Adidas $200,000
4 John Thompson Georgetown Nike $200,000
5 Dean Smith N.Carolina Converse $200,000
6 Jim Boeheim Syracuse Nike $150,000
7 Lute Olson Arizona Nike $150,000
8 Jerry Tarkanian UNLV Nike $150,000252
Not all universities permit the coach to contract directly with the shoe
company. For instance, University of Virginia coaches instead of having
contracts directly with shoe companies have the athletic department han-
dle the Cavaliers endorsement contracts by seeking bids.253 The Virginia's
Attorney General's office issued an opinion that any coach at a state univer-
sity who accepted promotional money from athletic shoe companies was
violating the state conflict of interest laws.2
One of the legacies of Lefty Driesel's departure from Maryland after the
death of Len Bias was a rule that Terrapin coaches could no longer negoti-
ate private endorsement contracts.255 The new Maryland policy requires
the university to negotiate all endorsement contracts and the coach shares
in the revenues on a negotiated basis.256
4. Income from Speeches and Written Material
The contract should permit the coach to deliver speeches, make public
appearances, grant media interviews, write and release books and magazine
articles and receive the compensation therefor. The coach will also want
permission to utilize publicly his reference to the university as coach. The
252. The Sporting News, February 4, 1991, at 42, col. - "In 1985, Americans paid $1.4
billion for athletic footwear. This year we will spend an estimated $5.5 billion. Long range
predictions put sales over $20 billion by the end of the century." Milw. J., June 24, 1990, at C3,
col 1; "In 1990, Nike became the largest sports and fitness footwear and apparel company in the
world. Profit for Nike's entire 1990 fiscal year rose 45% to $242.96 million or $6.24 a share form
$166.05 million or $4.45 a share in 1989. Annual revenue rose 31% to $2.24 billion from 1989's
$1.71 billion. In the United States alone, Nike estimates that it holds about 28% of the market.
Its closest competitors, Reebok International Inc., and L.A. Gear Inc., hold 22% and 12% of the
US market respectively." Milwaukee Sentinel, July 10, 1990 Part 2, at 2 col. 4.
253. The Sporting News, Nov. 24, 1986, at 38, col. 1.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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university, however, will want some type of limiting clause that the coach
represents the university in a professional manner and does not bring any
discredit or disrespect upon the university in such spoken and written
materials.
Success breeds success on the rubber chicken circuit. Southern Cal
head coach Larry Smith, who makes only $97,000 in base salary is guaran-
teed $150,000 annually from the USC Speakers Bureau.' 7 He earns $6,000
for each speaking engagement.258 Terry Donahue of UCLA also earns
$6,000 for every speaking engagement while former Pitt head coach, Mike
Gottfied, earned $5,000.00.259 Lou Holtz of Notre Dame, however, is the
king of college football coaches when it comes to speaking engagements.
He commands $18,000 per speech and accepts as many as 30 speaking dates
during the off-season."z t Companies interested in retaining Holtz must
book him six months in advance.26
1
5. Summer Camps
Another source of income for the coach is summer athletic camps and
clinics. The first issue to be considered is whether the university or the
coach is the sponsor of such camps. Normally, the coach will want the
opportunity to use the university's facilities in connection with such sum-
mer camp without cost or at a minimum cost. Another vital question will
be which party is to provide and pay for the camp's liability insurance. An
example of a summer camp provision is as follows:
As additional consideration for the services to be rendered by the
Coach hereunder, the University shall make available to Coach for
summer basketball camps the use of the University gyms and facili-
ties at a rate not to exceed $3.00 per camper per week and will
charge Coach lodging and food costs for the campers at normal Uni-
versity rates. The $3.00 per camper per week shall include the use of
the University's gym and related facilities, including locker room,
swimming pool and the like and shall further include any and all
insurance required for the purposes of operating such summer bas-
ketball camps.2 62
Murray Sperber in his book, College Sports, Inc., provides the following
commentary on the profits many coaches earn from their summer camps:
257. The Sporting News, Oct. 23, 1989, at 56, col. 2.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at col. 3, 4.
262. See supra note 179.
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Unlike intercollegiate athletics, with its tremendous start-up costs
and huge ongoing expenses, camps can be established and run on a
small amount of capital. Because costs tend to be low - thanks to
the university - summer camp profits for many coaches are out-
standing, in many cases double their annual salaries.
Coaches run their camps in one-week sessions, for as many as ten
weeks during a summer; campers who board pay an average of $200
to $300 a week; day campers, $150 to $250. Bill Frieder, when at
Michigan, is reported to have grossed over $350,000 for his 1986
basketball summer camps. Charles "Lefty" Driesell, the former
coach at Maryland, resigned from his coaching job after his star
player, Len Bias, died from a cocaine-induced seizure; Driesell, how-
ever, insisted on keeping his camps at the university and, in 1986,
had 875 kids pay $264 each for a $231,00 gross. Moreover, in his
settlement agreement with Maryland, the school continued its
$20,000 subsidy to defray Driesell's dorm and facility bill. Even
when Driesell moved to James Madison University, he got to keep
his Maryland camps and subsidies.263
H. Disclosure of Outside Income
Article 3, Section 2g of the NCAA Constitution requires annual disclo-
sure by the coach to the president of the university through the athletic
director of all athletically-related income and benefits earned or received
from outside sources.2" The purpose of this requirement is to monitor the
sources of a coach's outside income and to increase and maintain university
control over intercollegiate athletic programs. The rule also was intended
to have university presidents informed of possible conflicts of interest and
commercial influences on coaches. Hofmann and Greenberg in SportS Biz
provide an interesting interpretation of the disclosure issue:
There was a move in 1988 to get some kind of handle on coaches'
outside income. A proposal was drafted that would require institu-
tion approval before a coach could take the money directly. To no
one's great surprise, 77% of the university presidents surveyed were
all for the idea, and 94% of the basketball coaches were against it.
The coaches fought off outright limits on outside income with a
compromise measure requiring them to report what they made to
school administrators. But they weren't really crazy about that
either, because they figured the administrators would disclose what
263. M. SPERBER, supra note 5, at 180.
264. 1991-1992 NCAA DIVISION I BYLAWS, Art. 11.2.2.
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the coaches told them, thereby creating pressure for income
limits.
2 6 5
Former University of Kansas head basketball coach, Larry Brown, was
not pleased with NCAA efforts involving controlling sources of outside in-
come. Brown stated, "[d]o universities oversee the money professors make
from royalties and from being on corporate boards... I'll accept them limit-
ing what I earn if they will grant me tenure." 266
Some coaches are not only against limits on their outside income, but
are also reluctant to release income information to the public. For instance,
the Charleston Gazette completed a story about West Virginia head football
coach, Don Nehlen's and head basketball coach, Gale Catlett's income
sources only after the newspaper filed a Freedom of Information request.26 7
This request revealed that outside income, including an endowment, shoe
contract and sports camps more than tripled the base salary of Nehlen and
Catlett. 26 1 The Gazette reported that Nehlen earned $224,909 to coach
football and Catlett earned $198,484 a year.2 69 Nehlen's base salary from
the State of West Virginia was $71,208.70 This amount was increased by
$3,800 from his football camp, $49,000 from the athletic department en-
dowment fund and $25,000 from the Mountaineer Athletic Club (MAC),
the newspaper reported.27
The football coach also earned $40,000 from the Mountaineer Sports
Network and $11,900 from West Virginia Radio for his radio and television
shows; $12,000 for advertising Chrysler automobiles; $10,000 from a shoe
contract and $2,000 for personal appearances, the Gazette added.27 2 Cat-
lett, who earned a state base pay of $60,684, earned an additional $21,000
from his summer basketball camps and $36,000 from the endowment
fund.2 73 He also earned $31,000 from a shoe contract; $30,000 from the
Mountaineer Sports Network and $19,600 from West Virginia Radio, the
newspaper reported.274
265. D. HOFMANN & M. GREENBERG, supra note 244, at 101-02.
266. Lederman, Will Proposal to Oversee Coaches' Pay Trip the Great Sneakers Sweep-
stakes, Chronicle of Higher Education, October 29, 1986, at 38, col. 1.
267. Catlett, Nehlen Earns $200,000 Annually, United Press International, May 5, 1989.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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Both Catlett and Nehlen had received large income increases during the
last several years. During the 1984-85 fiscal year, Nehlen earned $154,824
while Catlett earned $143,842.275
By contrast, the average West Virginia University professor earns
$35,500.276
I. Guaranteed Contracts
College coaches, should attempt to negotiate a "guaranteed contract"
with the university. This may be a quid pro quo for a long-term contract.
The university agrees to guarantee a portion or all of the coach's salary
regardless if the coach should die or become disabled during the term of the
contract. An example of a "guaranteed contract" provision is as follows:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, the compensation as
stated in Paragraph 4 shall be deemed to be a Guaranteed Base Sal-
ary. "Guaranteed Base Salary" as used herein shall mean that
Coach shall be paid said Base Salary as hereinbefore stated through
the term of this Agreement regardless of and in the event that the
Coach shall die or beconie partially and/or totally disabled so that
the services as hereinbefore referenced cannot be performed pursu-
ant to the terms hereof. The intention as hereinstated is that the
Base Salary as from time-to-time increased and determined during
each year of the term of this Agreement shall be deemed to be guar-
anteed and paid as a contractual obligation of the University for the
entire term of this Agreement as extended. It shall be the Univer-
sity's sole financial responsibility to fund the guarantee as herein
contemplated either with its own financial resources and/or the
purchase of such insurance policies as to guarantee the payment as
herein required.277
J. Termination Clauses
The volatility of the coaching profession and the number of firings, re-
movals and job movements make termination clauses one of the most signif-
icant provisions in the coaching contract. Often times, a coach's career is
launched upon a contract which has been poorly drafted since it is not pre-
pared to handle the many situations which may arise during the course of
the contract term including premature termination. The end result is that
one side is forced to abandon ship and often amid rocky waters.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See supra note 179.
[Vol. 1:207
COACHING CONTRACTS
A. Death- Disability
The university will want the employment contract to automatically ter-
minate if the coach dies or becomes totally disabled with the coach's salary
and all other benefits terminating as of the calendar month in which death
occurs, except that the coach's personal representative shall be entitled to
such other death benefits, if any, and such disability/salary continuation
benefits to which he is entitled under the university's disability program.
The coach's representative will attempt to negotiate a guarantee provi-
sion in the contract at least with respect to the base salary so that in the
event the coach should die or become partially or totally disabled, the base
salary would be guaranteed and paid by the university for the entire term of
the contract either through the university's funds or through the purchase
of such insurance policies as are necessary to guarantee the required
payments.
1. Termination by the University for Just Cause
Termination clauses whether or not they require "just cause," are gener-
ally the most difficult to negotiate in the employment contract. Termina-
tion controversies between coaches and universities have drawn and will
continue to draw great attention from the media. A coach's contract will
almost always contain "termination for just cause" provisions empowering
the university to terminate the contract at any time at its sole discretion if
there is a determination by the university that the coach has committed a
violation, intentionally or not, of any law, rule, regulation, constitutional
provisions or by-law of the university, United States, the state of jurisdic-
tion, the participating conference or the NCAA and such violation reflects
adversely upon or may impugn the image of the coach, university or its
athletic program, including any deliberate or serious violation which may
result in the university being placed on probation. The NCAA requires
that contractual agreements between a coach and a university include a
stipulation that the coach may be suspended for a period of time, without
pay, or that the coach's employment may be terminated if the coach is
found to be involved in deliberate and serious violations of NCAA
regulations.278
The Knight Commission reports that approximately one-half of all Di-
vision I-A institutions (the 106 colleges and universities with the most com-
petitive and expensive football programs) were the object of sanctions of
varying severity from the NCAA during the 1980s.2 79 Rules, rules, rules, it
278. 1991-92 NCAA DIVISION I BYLAWS, Art. 11.2.1.1.
279. THE KNIGHT FOUNDATION COMMISSION REPORT ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS,
supra note 102, at 6.
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seems that college sports has become a panoply of rules and interpretations.
The Knight Commission Report indicates that, "[s]ome rules have been de-
veloped to manage potential abuse in particular sports, in particular
schools, or in response to particular circumstances of individual athletes.
Whatever the origin of these regulations, the administration of intercollegi-
ate athletics is now so over burdened with legalism and detail that the
NCAA Manual more clearly resembles the IRS Code than it does a guide
to action."280 Even the simplest of rules may taint the coach and trigger
sanctions in his contract. The Knight Commission further requests that the
NCAA applies itself to the task of simplifying and codifying complex
NCAA rules and procedures.281
Any man or woman on the street should be able to understand what
the NCAA does, how it works, how it makes its decisions and, in
particular, how it determines its sanctions. As it stands, not only
can the average person not answer those questions, but very few
presidents, athletic directors, coaches or student-athletes can predict
what it is likely to do in any given circumstance.282
Therefore, the coach will need to protect himself with respect to this re-
quired "termination for cause" provision. The coach may want to require
that in order for a termination for cause to exist, (1) that such rules viola-
tion be determined or adjudicated by the university, the NCAA or any
other equivalent body and/or a court of law and (2) that the coach has
committed a MAJOR violation, and did so knowingly or intentionally in
violation of those rules.
There is a second category of just cause provisions calling for termina-
tion of the head coach if a member of the coaching staff commits a serious
violation of NCAA rules providing that such acts were either under the
control or direction of the head coach. In essence, the head coach becomes
responsible for the acts of his coaching staff. While a principal/agent - re-
spondeat superior relationship may exist, once again, the head coach needs
to protect himself by specifying that the acts of assistants would have an
effect on his employment only if the coach had actual knowledge of such
violations or directed that such violations occur. The same should hold
true with respect to student-athletes who also can violate the rules of the
NCAA.
Finally, there are provisions for immediate termination in the event the
head coach refuses to perform any of the duties which are reasonably re-
280. Id. at 8.
281. Id. at 29.
282. Id. at 30.
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lated to his position and/or where such duties cannot be performed because
of such disability or illness which would make the head coach unavailable
to perform such duties. Termination clauses are normally accompanied by
a clause exonerating the university from any further liability for salary ben-
efits or other compensation after termination.
By their very nature, termination provisions should be negotiated be-
tween the parties. A statement of what constitutes grounds for termination
is necessary. The coach will also want to establish some independent dis-
pute resolution process such as a due process hearing, arbitration hearing or
third party mediator for determining whether grounds for termination ex-
ist. If the university retains the right to make such determinations unilater-
ally, the coach's interests may be compromised.
The MCC Agreement defines just cause as:
(1) deliberate and serious violations of the duties outlined in Sec-
tion 3.02 of this Agreement or refusal or unwillingness to
perform such duties in good faith and to the best of the
Coaches abilities;
(2) violations by the Coach of any of the other terms and condi-
tions of this Agreement not remedied after (-)
days' written notice thereof to the employee;
(3) situations in which the University determines that the best
interests of the University and of its intercollegiate
program require that the Coach no longer retain the position
of Coach of the University's - team initially assigned
to him under this Agreement and the employee does not ac-
cept reassignment of responsibilities in accordance with the
provisions of Section 3.01 above;
(4) any conduct of the employee in violation of any criminal
statute of moral turpitude;
(5) a serious or intentional violation of any law, rule, regulation,
constitutional provision, bylaw or interpretation of the Uni-
versity, the - Conference or the NCAA, which viola-
tion may, in the sole judgment of the University, reflect
adversely upon the University or its athletic program, in-
cluding any serious violation which may result in the Uni-
versity being placed on probation by the - Conference
or the NCAA and including any violation which may have
occurred during prior employment of the employee at an-
other NCAA member institution;
(6) a serious or intentional violation of any law, rule, regulation,
constitutional provision, bylaw or interpretation of the Uni-
versity, the - Conference or the NCAA by a member
of the - coaching staff or any other person under the em-
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ployee's supervision and direction, including student-athletes
in the - program, which violation may, in the sole judg-
ment of the University, reflect adversely upon the University
or its athletic program, including any serious violation which
may result in the University being placed on probation by
the - Conference or the NCAA;
(7) conduct of the employee seriously prejudicial to the best in-
terests of the University or its athletic program or which vio-
lates the University's mission;
(8) prolonged absence from duty without the consent of the em-
ployee's reporting superior; or
(9) any cause adequate to sustain the termination of any other
University coach of the Coach's classification.283
Another definition of "just cause" for termination purposes is as
follows:
COACH'S employment being terminated by the Board of Directors
of the University "for cause." Termination "for cause" shall be lim-
ited solely to termination by the action of the Board of Directors
because of (a) gross negligence of Coach in the performance of his
obligations under this Agreement; (b) the habitual intoxication or
inexcusable repeated or prolonged absence from work of COACH;
(c) the perpetration by Coach of a willful fraud against the Univer-
sity or its programs; (d) the failure of COACH to perform faithfully
the duties of his office or the duties which are otherwise assigned to
him by the Board of Directors of the University or its President, so
long as such duties are consistent with the skills and experiences of
COACH; (e) COACH's complicity in an immoral act which is in-
consistent with the University's stated objectives and philosophies;
or (f) the indictment of COACH for a felony as same is defined by
the laws of the State of -. Termination "for cause" shall occur
upon delivery to COACH of a notice of such action by the Board of
Directors of the University, which notice shall specify the grounds
for such termination. If COACH's employment is terminated "for
cause," the University's only obligation to COACH shall be pay-
ment of the salary through the end of the month in which such ter-
mination occurs ... 284
From a coach's perspective, specific acts constituting just cause for ter-
mination need to be strictly defined rather than couched in broad based
statements. Such clauses as wilful fraud, moral turpitude or habitual intoxi-
283. Stoner & Nogay, supra note 29, at 75, 76.
284. Stoner, supra note 30, at 28.
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cation may have a different meaning to different parties. Therefore, these
terms should be specifically defined in terms of specific prohibited acts.
In negotiating termination for just cause provisions, the definition of
"just cause" is factual in nature (such as moral turpitude, prejudicial con-
duct, prolonged absences, willful fraud, complicity in an inimoral act, habit-
ual intoxication, etc.) and, therefore, need to be determined by an impartial
hearing examiner. A due process procedure should be established for pur-
poses of an objective and impartial hearing to determine whether termina-
tion for just cause exists. Such procedure should include a statement of the
charges against the coach, the right to a hearing, the opportunity for a
coach to be present and to present a defense, the right to have an attorney
present to advise the coach and to counsel and state his case and/or such
other procedures as shall be governed by normal university grievance
procedures.
Affording a coach some opportunity to a hearing and the right to chal-
lenge the university's charges for termination for cause is especially signifi-
cant if a state institution is involved since the termination itself may be
considered "state action" subject to due process provisions. In virtually all
litigation in which an individual argues that his constitutional rights have
been violated, the court can grant relief only if it finds that there has been
state action, i.e., some sort of participation by a government entity sufficient
to make the particular constitutional provision applicable.
When Earle Bruce was fired by Ohio State and filed a $7.45 million
lawsuit against the institution,285 one of his contentions was that his unlaw-
ful termination involved state action and, therefore, his constitutional rights
were violated including denial of due process and equal protection of the
law and deprivation of property without just compensation.286
An example of a due process procedure is as follows:
285. Earl Bruce v. The Ohio State University, Case No. 87 CV-1 1-7430.; "Fired Cleveland
State men's basketball coach Kevin Mackey plans to challenge his dismissal, claiming he was
discriminated against because he is an alcoholic, the News-Herald of Willoughby, Ohio reported
Thursday. Mackey's attorney, David Roth, filed a complaint with the Ohio Civil Rights Commis-
sion charging the school failed to provide him with reasonable accommodation for his chemical
dependency. Mackey pleaded no contest last fall to charges of cocaine abuse and driving under
the influence. Cleveland State fired Mackey six days after his July 13 arrest. 'We think we can
defend our position,' said university spokesman Ed Mayer." U.S.A. Today, Mar. 29, 1991, at 1C,
col. 1.
286. Id. From the pleadings of Bruce, paragraph 11, "The actions taken by the defendant.
Edward H. Jennings and defendant, The Ohio University, acting under the color of state law and
authority, deprived plaintiff of his contracted for and non-contracted for property rights and have
further denied the plaintiff due process and equal protection, in violation of the laws of the State of
Ohio and the United States of America, including the first Amendment, the Fifth Amendment
and the Fourteenth Amendment."
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(a) Employment may be suspended for a period of time, without
pay, or terminated, with immediate cessation of salary pay-
ments and fringe benefits, for cause. Cause for suspension or
termination shall be a violation by a Coach, or a violation by
a coach under that Coach's supervision of which that Coach
was aware or was of a character or extent that the Coach
should have been aware, of any of the rules, regulations or
policies of the Big Ten Conference or the National Collegiate
Athletic Association, as modified from time to time.
(b) Prior to suspension or termination, an Employe (i) shall be
provided with written notice of contemplated suspension or
termination, a statement of the reasons and facts in support
thereof and (ii) shall have five calendar days from receipt of
such notice to deliver a written request for a hearing on the
contemplated action. Written requests shall be delivered to
the Office of the Chancellor. If no written request is received
by the Chancellor as provided herein, a contemplated sus-
pension or termination shall become final five calendar days
following the coach's receipt of such notice.
(c) Upon receipt of a written request for hearing, the Chancellor
will appoint a three person hearing board, composed of two
individuals from the Athletic board and one other University
coach, to consider the matter and hear reasons for and
against the contemplated action. The Coach has the right to
appear before the hearing board, with a representative if he
desires, to comment on the reasons given for the contem-
plated action and to present reasons against it. The hearing
board shall not be bound by formal or technical rules of evi-
dence. It will send written findings of fact and recommenda-
tions on the matter to the Chancellor or, if the Chancellor
designates someone else, his designee. The Chancellor or his
designee may seek counsel from the Athletic Board, shall
consider the matter and notify, in writing, the Coach, the
Director of Intercollegiate Athletics and the hearing board of
the decision, which shall be final. 87
287. University of Illinois Due Process Procedures as Part of Employment contract, Title,
Supervision & Termination; Chronicle of Higher Education, February 1, 1989, at 29, 31; Chroni-
cle of Higher Education, February 15, 1989, at 36; Gary Moss, the former men's basketball coach
at Sam Houston State University has sued the university, the NCAA and several of their officials
claiming that his rights under the Texas lawyer claimed that he has been fired without receiving a
hearing as required for all state employees in Texas. The lawyer indicated the Sam Houston State
University used the findings of the NCAA investigation, which he said does not meet due process
standards under Texas law, to support the dismissal. Moss's attorney said that Moss should have
been able to examine the evidence and confront his accusers. The law suit was ultimately settled
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Finally, if the coach is dismissed for cause, the contract should state the
effect therefor including cessation of compensation and fringe benefits as of
the end of the month in which such termination occurs. The university will
also want to indicate that it has no liability for loss of any collateral busi-
ness opportunities or any other benefits, perquisites, or income resulting
from the job as a result of said termination.
Murray Sperber in his book, College Sports, Inc., indicates that Univer-
sities, even though they may have cause to dismiss a coach, and even
though that coach may cause a NCAA investigation and ensuing penalties,
prefer to settle their differences with a breaching coach rather than fire
them outright.288 This is so, even though the university is absolved from its
obligations if the coach violates NCAA rules:
When Mike White, after years of incurring NCAA sanctions and
negative publicity for the University of Illinois, finally quit, the
school rewarded him with $300,000 settlement. Barry Switzer set-
tled with the University of Oklahoma for $225,000 during its recent
troubles. After the NCAA put Texas A & M on probation for over
twenty-five violations during Jackie Sherrill's regime, the school
waved goodbye to this football coach and AD with a $684,000 cash
settlement and a house. And when Danny Ford resigned in 1990 at
Clemson, with the NCAA cops at the gates, he was rewarded with a
settlement that could top $1.1 million.289
Because of the potential for litigation that may ensue after a coach is
terminated for "just cause" and the coach's probable contesting of the facts
therefor, the representatives of the coach and the university may want to
simply ease the burden of a continued dispute. If there is a proceeding for
just cause the university and the coach may mutually agree to a resignation
format with the payment of some termination fee or liquidated damages.
when the university assigned Moss to a non-athletic post. The Chronicle of Higher Education,
February 1, 1989, at 29, 31; The Chronicle of Higher Education, February 15, 1989, at 6.
288. M. SPERBER, supra note 5, at 165.
289. Id. at 155-66; Gone But Not Forgotten;
Clemson football coach Danny Ford resigned Thursday, but will continue to be compensated
by the university. Under the terms of his resignation he will receive:
-$190,000 a year for three years.
-Additional payments: For six months if he is hired elsewhere before Nov. 15, 1991; and
two years if he is not hired before Nov. 15, 1992. there will be no payments beyond five
years. As long as he is receiving payments, he will receive six football season tickets.
-He may stay in his home through May, 1990 and keep the automobile (van) he is using.
-The university will pay $13,000 in mortgage interest on his farm in 1990, pay the balance
of the mortgage, $100,000, and maintain health insurance for Ford and his family through
Dec. 31, 1990.
Gone But Not Forgotten, U.S.A. Today, Jan. 19, 1990, at 8C, col.-.
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2. Termination Without Cause or for Any Other Reason
The coach's contract will also reserve to the university the right to ter-
minate the coach's employment for reasons other than those set forth in the
termination for "just cause" provision or for no reason at all. This termina-
tion provision is more concerned with defining the university's financial lia-
bility than the reasons for termination. Thus, when the coach is terminated
without cause, the issue centers on the determination of the amount of dam-
ages that the coach will receive, the nature of the damages and the method
of payment. A number of options are available, including:
1. A negotiated stated amount.
2. The coach's base salary or other compensation items for the remain-
der of the contract term.
3. The percentage of the base salary and other compensation packages
for the remainder of the agreement.
4. De-escalating amount depending upon the year of the agreement
and the termination therefor.
5. A lump sum settlement.
What benefits the coach will receive should be strictly defined in the
contract upon a premature termination. If liquidated damages are agreed
to, the university will want a provision indicating it will not be liable for the
loss of any collateral benefits, perquisites or income resulting from activities
such as but not limited to camps, clinics, media appearances, apparel, shoe
contracts, consulting relationship or from any other sources that may ensue
as a result of the university's termination of this agreement without cause or
because of the coach's position as such. The liquidated damage provision
will also indicate that said damages are bargained for damages and consti-
tute a reasonable and adequate consideration to the coach and shall not be
construed to be in the nature of a penalty.
Another issue is the coach's obligation to mitigate damages, i.e., ob-
taining reasonably comparable employment or other employment for pur-
poses of offsetting the damages agreed to be paid by the university. If other
employment is obtained, a question will arise as to whether or not the liqui-
dated damages agreed to be paid by the university ceases or the university's
obligation is modified to be the difference between the amount the univer-
sity agreed to pay and the amount received from the new employer, if any.
Most universities recognize their continuing liability under the contract
and continue to pay the coach throughout the contract term or buy-out the
contract for a lump sum. It has been suggested that a lump sum buy-out at
the time of the termination, based on the present value of the future pay-
ments to become due, is the proper measure of damages in such a situation
rather than the installment method. The theory is that since the breach is
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complete upon contract termination, complete damages are then due as
well. When negotiating the buy-out or the liquidated damages provisions of
a termination without just cause, consideration should also be given to con-
tinuation of some collateral benefits such as continued health insurance for
a time certain and the payment of moving expenses. An example of termi-
nation without cause provision favorable to the coach is as follows:
Termination Without Cause. In the event of the Employee's termi-
nation by the University for reasons other than as previously set
forth in this Agreement during the term of this Agreement, includ-
ing any extensions therefore, the Employee shall be entitled to the
remainder of any Annual Salary plus the University's contribution
to TIAA-CREF (retirement plan) owed under and pursuant to the
terms of this Agreement plus 50% of the then scheduled radio and
T.V. income as hereinbefore referenced to be paid on the same date
as if Employee was still employed under and pursuant to this Agree-
ment for the term under which said amount shall be paid. In addi-
tion, the University shall continue to provide Employee after such
termination with such medical and health insurance benefits for the
balance of the term of this Agreement, including any extensions
therefor or until Employee obtains other full-time employment with
replacement policies whichever is the lesser period. It is the inten-
tion of this paragraph that in the event Employee should be termi-
nated without cause that Employee would continue to receive the
compensation and benefits as herein specified for the full remaining
term of this Agreement without any obligation to mitigate damages
and, in addition to compensation he may be receiving from other
employment, even if the employment is similar to the employment
as hereinstated. In the event Employee is terminated without cause,
Employee shall be entitled to conduct the summer camp and receive
all benefits therefrom pursuant to paragraph 8 of this Agreement
during the summer subsequent to said termination. In no case shall
the University be liable for loss of any collateral business opportu-
nity or other benefits, perquisites or income from any sources that
may ensue as a result of the University's termination of this
Agreement.290
There are a number of celebrated termination cases that need to be
reviewed.
On November 20, 1987, Earl Bruce was fired by Ohio State University.
He filed a $7.45 million lawsuit against the institution and its president.291
290. See supra note 179.
291. Earl Bruce v. The Ohio State University and Edward H. Jennings, President and Ed-
ward H. Jennings Individually; Franklin county Ohio, Case N. 87-CVI 1-7430; N. Y. Times, Nov.
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Bruce charged breach of contract, wrongful dismissal and slander.292 Be-
cause the termination involved state action, constitutional law violations
were also alleged, including denial of due process and equal protection and
the deprivation of property without just compensation.293 In the ad
damnum clause to Bruce's complaint, the following damages were
requested:
A. $448,800 for breach of contract (salary and package).
B. $2 million for violation of Bruce's constitutional rights.
C. $5 million in compensation and punitive damages.294
It should be noted that Bruce's contract specifically stated that the uni-
versity was not liable for consequential damages of any kind in the event of
early termination.295 The university only contractual obligation was to pay
salary and employee benefits, subject to the usual offset.29 6 The case was
ultimately settled for $47 1,000.297
In Yukica v. Leland,298 in December of 1986, Joe Yukica, prevented
Dartmouth College's attempt to fire him when he obtained a temporary
court order restraining the athletic director from hiring a replacement
coach.2 99 The coach argued that he was not given 12-months' notice of
termination as required by his contract. Yukica's contract had been re-
newed in the summer of 1986 and extended to June of 1987. In November,
after his second straight losing season, Dartmouth athletic director, Ted
Leland, told Yukica that he was being relieved of his coaching duties and
would be reassigned elsewhere in the college."°° In December of 1986, the
coach filed suit. In January 1987, a settlement was reached allowing
Yukica to remain as coach through the 1987 season.3"1 The settlement
called for Yukica to get roughly a $1,700.00 pay increase, $57,511 in 1986,
retention of the use of a car and house while serving as coach, and $70,000
in settlement of his claims.302
17, 1987, at D3 1, col. 4; Nov. 28, 1987, at 43, col. 1; The Chronicle of Higher Education, Dec. 2,
1987, at A37, col. 2.
292. Chronicle of Higher Education, Dec. 2, 1987, at 37, col. 2.
293. Earl Bruce, Case No. 87 CV-1 1-7430, complaint at 6.
294. Id. at 89.
295. Earl Bruce, Case No. 87 CV-1 1-7430, Exhibit A at 3.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Yukica v. Leland, Farrel, Dartmouth; Chronicle of Higher Education, Nov. 19, 1986, at
39, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1985, at B20, col. 1.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. An out of court settlement was reached by former University of Wisconsin-Stevens
Point coach, D.J. LeRoy, who was fired following a scandal involving ineligible players. LeRoy
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Another celebrated case is that of Ben Lindsey, former head basketball
coach at the University of Arizona.30 3 Lindsey brought various actions
against the University of Arizona for breach of contract and breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and for loss of future earn-
ing capacity. 3°4 In addition, he sued Cedric Dempsey, former athletic di-
rector and Henry Koffier, President of the University for breach of
contract, fraud, intentional interference with contractual relations and in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress.3"5 In Lindsey, the court affirmed a
judgment in favor of Lindsey for $215,000 for loss of employment 30 6 for
three years, and an additional $91,312 for attorney's fees. However, the
court also vacated a judgment insofar as an award of $480,000 for loss of
future earning capacity.30 7 With respect to this aspect of the case, Lindsey
maintained that he should receive damages because of the difficulty that he
would have and would, in the future, encounter in obtaining employment as
a coach in view of his premature termination as coach of the University of
Arizona.30 8 The court indicated that damages for diminution of future
earning power capacity are not recoverable in action for breach of an em-
ployment contract. °9 The jury, the court held, could do nothing more than
engage in speculation and conjecture as to the effect Lindsey's termination
would have on his future earning capacity. 10
Probably the most celebrated case is the demise of former North Caro-
lina State head basketball coach Jim Valvano. With the release of Personal
was fired a year ago when the school was forced to forfeit its 12 victories in 1987, the Wisconsin
State University Conference title and a share of the NAIA Division I1 championship because two
players were ineligible. The settlement absolves LeRoy of any responsibility regarding the athletic
eligibility of the two players. It also call for the State to pay him $40,000. Said LeRoy, "My
primary objectives since last May have been to obtain a respect to the loss of the 1987 football
season and the national co-championship. I consider this settlement as a total vindication." Le-
Roy is now a coach at Coe College in Cedar Rapids, Iowa; The Sporting News, May 15, 1989, at
49, col. 1. Bob Wade, former University of Maryland basketball coach, was the subject of an
NCAA investigation involving allegations that Wade gave improper rides to class to a player.
Wade misstated this role to investigators thereafter. Wade helped players accumulate frequent
flyer bonus points from airline tickets purchased by the Athletic Department and received small
sums of cash on occasions. For his resignation, Wade received $120,000 cash settlement which
amounted to about 60% of Wade's salary for the remaining two years of his five year contract and
the settlement further calls for the University foundation to buy his house near campus and to pay
$5,000 towards moving expenses. Wash. Post, May 13, 1989, at Al, A6, col. 1, col.2.
303. Lindsey v. University of Arizona, 157 Ariz. 48, 754 P.2d 1152 (Ariz. App. 1987).
304. Id. at 1152.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 1157, 1159.
307. Id. at 1158.
308. Id. at 1157, 1158.
309. Id. at 1158.
310. Id.
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
Fouls by Peter Golenbock,31' the announcement by the NCAA that North
Carolina State was to be placed on probation for two years because of play-
ers selling shoes and complimentary tickets and the announcement by for-
mer Valvano player, Charles Shackleford, currently of the New Jersey Nets,
that he accepted loans while playing at State, the fate of Valvano had al-
ready been determined.312 Evidently, Valvano's contract contained both a
buy out clause and a termination provision. Valvano was required to pay
$500,000 if he left the university and the university was required to pay
$500,000 if Valvano was prematurely terminated.313 Valvano even offered
to coach the basketball team for $1 (presumably to preserve his lucrative
outside income sources and the name position of head coach) for the ensu-
ing season.31 4 An out-of-court settlement was reached between Valvano
and the university. He agreed to leave the university voluntarily and not to
sue the school in exchange for $238,000 ($26,509.24 for salary payments
through May 15, 1990 and $212,000 buy out for the remaining term of his
contract).1 5 In addition, Valvano expected to receive $375,000 from the
university's booster club, The Wolf-Pack Club, in the form of a $250,000
annuity and $125,000 under a "loss revenue provision".31 6
K. Buy Out - Release Provisions
Generally, an employer cannot obtain specific performance of a personal
service contract. That is, neither the employer nor the courts can require a
coach to work even if the contract specifically provides for such services.
Courts are reluctant to issue injunctions compelling employment because of
the inherent logistical problems in effectively supervising and enforcing
such decrees. Courts have historically viewed this form of affirmative relief
as violating public policy and the Thirteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, as it subjects individuals to a form of involuntary
servitude.
With respect to a contract jumping coach, it would appear, at least in
theory, that the university could bring an action for monetary damages
against the coach in breach of contract. In such cases the recoverable dam-
ages are normally measured by the cost of the employer in obtaining
equivalent services elsewhere, plus consequential damages. Some cases in-
311. P. GOLENBOCK, PERSONAL FOULS (1989).
312. L.A. Times, July 26, 1990, at 16C, col. 6.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Buyout Accord Reached By Valvano, N. C. State, Sports Industry News, Apr. 13, 1990, at
111; see also, The Wash. Post, Apr. 8, 1990, at C1, col.
316. Id.
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dicate that in assessing such damages, the "market value" of the lost serv-
ices must be measured against that of the substitute services procured by
the employer to remedy the breach.
These rules sound reasonable but they may be quite difficult to
apply, particularly for an institution contemplating suit against a de-
parted coach. First, measuring the 'value' of one coach's services
compared to another's is an inherently difficult problem unlikely to
provide an easy answer. Second, due to the intense publicity in-
volved, to engage in litigation with the departing coach can prolong
the parties' bad feelings and put a cloud over the institution's entire
athletic program. This adverse publicity can easily continue for
years while a complex case is pending in court. Third, while some
damages, such as the expenses of searching out a new coach, are
easily ascertainable, the complex compensation arrangements under
which most coaches operate, where base salary is but one element in
the compensation "package," could make it extremely difficult for a
jury to calculate exactly what it has cost the institution to obtain the
services of the new coach. '317
As a result, most institutions allow their restless or ambitious coaches to
leave gracefully without further legal recourse.
Recently, however, universities are imposing buy out provisions on
coaches who wish to depart early. Normally, the buy out provision will be
for a predetermined lump sum or an amount predicated on a de-escalating
scale, depending upon when the coach terminates. Washington State Uni-
versity seems to be an anomaly in the field of enforcement of coach's con-
tracts. It is alleged that the university is the first institution of higher
education to sue a jumping coach and to generate a settlement therefor.318
With two years remaining on his contract, Warren Powers, the then head
football coach, left for better pastures for the same job at the University of
Missouri.319 Washington State University sued and ultimately ended up
with a $55,000 settlement.320 In 1989, Washington State University was,
once again, faced with a jumping coach. 321 Dennis Erickson decided to
depart for Miami, as a result therefor, ended up paying the university
$150,000 to settle his contract.
Gene Keady, Purdue head basketball coach, was recently offered the job
at Arizona State University for a greater compensation package than he had
317. Graves, supra note 27, at 548.
318. M. SPERBER, supra note 5, at 165.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. The Sporting News, Mar. 20, 1989, at 26.
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at Purdue.32 2 However, his Purdue contract had a buy out provision of
$200,000.323 Keady chose to stay at Purdue rather than expending the re-
quired buy out figure, or asking his new employer to incur the obligation to
release him of his prior contractual obligations. 324
Some examples of a buy out-release provision are as follows:
If at any time during the term of this agreement, coach shall submit
his resignation as head basketball coach for any reason other than
disability due to illness or accident, then he shall pay to the univer-
sity the sum of $- to compensate the university for injury suf-
fered by reason of a breach of this contract resulting from such
resignation, it being very difficult to ascertain or estimate the entire
exact cost, damage or injury which the university as employer may
sustain by reason of such breach. The parties agree that such sum is
reasonable and appropriate compensation for the injuries suffered by
the university under the same circumstances and that it is not a
penalty.
325
Another example of a buy out release provision is as follows:
Voluntary Termination by Coach. In the event Coach voluntarily
terminates his employment with the University during the term of
this Agreement, the University shall be discharged of any and all
further obligations of this Agreement with respect to the obligation
to pay and/or provide the benefits as herein specified to Coach. In
the event the Coach desires to voluntarily terminate this Employ-
ment Agreement and take another position as a Division One
Coach, Coach will be required to buy-out the terms of this Agree-
ment and pay the University according and pursuant to the follow-
ing schedule:
a. Without regards to the rollover provisions as herein con-
tained, if Coach desires to terminate the terms of this Agree-
ment after the first year of employment hereunder, Coach
shall pay to the University 80% of the Annual Salary for the
remaining term of this Agreement.
b. Without regards to the rollover provisions as herein con-
tained, if Coach desires to terminate the terms of this Agree-
ment after the second year of employment hereunder, Coach
shall pay to the University 60% of the Annual Salary for the
remaining term of the Agreement.
322. Sports Industry News, Mar. 24, 1989, at Data Page.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Stoner, supra note 30, at 34.
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c. Without regards to the rollover provisions as herein con-
tained, if Coach desires to terminate the terms of this Agree-
ment after the third year of employment hereunder, Coach
shall pay to the University 40% of the Annual Salary for the
remaining term of the Agreement.
d. Without regards to the rollover provisions as herein con-
tained, if Coach desires to terminate the terms of this Agree-
ment after the fourth year of employment hereunder, Coach
shall pay to the University 20% of the Annual Salary for the
remaining term of the Agreement.
e. Without regards to the rollover provisions as herein con-
tained, if Coach desires to terminate the terms of this Agree-
ment after the fifth year of employment hereunder, Coach no
buy-out shall be required.
At the sole option and discretion of the Coach, said buy out pay-
ments may be made in lump-sum within ten (10) days after notifica-
tion of voluntary termination and/or on May 1st of each year of the
term of this Agreement with respect to the amount owed by Coach.
It is understood that this buy-out provision shall only apply to the
original term of this Agreement and shall not be included and/or
apply to any extensions of the original term hereof. 32 6
Some coaches will take a job with specific language in their contract that
they have the right to terminate their position with the university in the
event a specific named school offers a postition of head coach.327 For in-
stance, it was rumored that when Lou Holtz signed a contract with the
Minnesota Gopher football team, he had a contract clause that would per-
mit him to terminate that contract in the event he was offered the head
football coaching job at Notre Dame University. In essence then, the con-
tract advisor is negotiating an opt out clause wherein the coach is permitted
to terminate his employment and obligations pursuant to the employment
contract without any further obligation to the university on a condition sub-
sequent basis if a specific job was offered to the coach during the term of the
employment contract with the university.
L. Support of Program
The coach will want a covenant and commitment requiring the univer-
sity to provide academic, economic and other forms of support to the ath-
letic program at least equal to the level of support given to other athletic
programs by other universities in the athletic conference to which the uni-
326. Id.
327. M. SPERBER, supra note 5, at 167.
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versity is a member. Included in academic support would be: (1) academic
counselors, (2) tutoring, and (3) other educational services. Included in
economic support would be: (1) maintenance and improvement of physical
facilities, (i.e., office facilities, locker room facility, dining and dormitory
facilities as well as training and exercise facilities), (2) budgets sufficient to
hire and retain the maximum number of assistant coaches, (3) budgets nec-
essary to cover expenses associated with first class recruiting, (4) awarding
the maximum number of scholarships to athletes permissible under NCAA
rules. A coach will also want to be involved in the scheduling of games
subject to final authority being reposed in the university's athletic director.
M. Tenure
Normally, only ordinary faculty members can be given tenure. Tenure
is only granted in a specific academic capacity and a faculty member could
not achieve tenure in connection with his administration or athletic depart-
ment duties.
At the January, 1990, NCAA Convention, Executive Director Dick
Schultz suggested that schools give tenure to coaches. In any discussion of
tenure for coaches, the issue of job security versus job flexibility must be
weighed.328 Therefore, under present circumstances, the university will
want a clause indicating and confirming that the position of head coach of
an athletic team is not a tenured track position, and will not ultimately lead
to tenure.
N. Scheduling and Assistant Coaches
There will be some negotiation between the university and the coach
with respect to the coach's authority relative to the hiring and firing of
assistant coaches and the scheduling and rescheduling of games with re-
spect to the university's program. While the coach will request control over
the hiring and firing of his own assistants and the scheduling of the games,
the athletic director will probably want the right of approval or the right to
participate in the scheduling or hiring process itself.
0. Confidentiality
To the extent permitted by law and not prohibited by state open-record
laws or freedom of information acts, the university and coach will want the
328. Coaches Not United on Tenure, San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 10, 1990, at D8, col. -.
The following are cases related to the tenure issue for college coaches: see generally Hanlon v.
Providence College, 615 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1980); Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir.
1977).
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terms and conditions of the employment arrangements to be kept confiden-
tial. Each party will agree to refrain from disclosing the terms and condi-
tions of the employment agreement without the prior written consent of the
other. Unless, of course, disclosure is required by applicable state law. In
addition, the parties will probably want a confidentiality agreement con-
cerning disagreement and non-disclosure to third parties and the submis-
sion of any disagreements to some form of arbitration procedure.
Any public announcement with regards to the employment contract
shall be jointly agreed to concerning the agreement itself and/or any exten-
sions or modifications thereof.
The university will also want the coach, upon termination, to immedi-
ately cause certain information developed as a result of the position of head
coach to be delivered to the university as the sole and confidential property
of the university upon such termination. Such materials, without limita-
tion, may include personnel records, recruiting records, team information,
films, statistics, any other memoranda or data furnished to the coach by the
university or developed by the coach on behalf of the university as a result
of the position of coach.
P. Arbitration
During the course of the contract period there may be disputes between
the university and coach arising out of or concerning the scope, interpreta-
tion or provisions of the employment contract. Obviously, if there is a dis-
pute with respect to the contract either party has their legal remedies,
including injunctions against further continued breach, specific perform-
ance, if any, or damages arising out of such breaches. Another alternative,
other than utilization of the courts, is arbitration or some other form of
dispute resolution procedure where such disputes are submitted to an im-
partial third party. Obviously, any such clause would need to define the
disputes to be so submitted, the party to act as the objective third party
arbitrator, the rules under which the arbitration would be conducted and
the agreement that the decision of the arbitrator shall be binding without
further ability to appeal. Although the utilization of the courts may be a
leverage factor, a dispute resolution device may be more efficient, cost sav-
ing, time saving and ultimately equitable for both parties.
III. CONCLUSION
The Knight Commission characterizes the power coach as often en-
joying greater recognition throughout the state than most elected officials,
1991]
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and as the chief operating officer of a multimillion dollar business. 29 In-
deed, college sports is a business, but so is the relationship between a uni-
versity and its coach a business and contractual package. As such, that
relationship should be treated in the strictest contractual and legal sense.
Kevin O'Neill, Marquette University Basketball Coach, in a speech at Mar-
quette University Law School, on March 26, 1991 gave some important
perspectives to the real world of college coaching and contracts. O'Neill
suggested:
1. Get a lawyer.
2. Get all compensation terms in writing, nothing oral. Hand shake
deals are a custom of the past.
3. The day of the long-term contract is gone. Three to five year stays
will become normal.
4. Don't trust anyone. Contract negotiations is a business deal and
ultimately adversarial.
5. Because violation of NCAA Rules can mean an end to your con-
tract and maybe your career, document all activities on a daily basis
by the use of a diary.
6. Limit your liability with respect to the acts of other, especially stu-
dent-athletes and assistant coaches.
7. College athletics is big business and universities should not be limit-
ing the outside sources of income of coaches.
8. Plan for termination.330
Yes, job volatility and movement in the coaching industry is the main
concern and topic of most coaches today. On April 3, 1989, Jud Heathcote,
head basketball coach at Michigan State University and outgoing President
of the National Association of Basketball Coaches, announced that a fund
would be created for the rehabilitation and counselling of those coaches
who were dismissed. He stated that $2,000.00 will be made available to any
coach or member of his family for use, for counselling, self-rehabilitation or
career guidance. 331 It appears that lawyers will have a more heavy-handed
role in the contractual relationships between universities and coaches. Not
only in the contractual stage, but in the legal adversity in negotiated settle-
ments that seem to highlight those events that terminate the relationship
between universities and their coaches.
329. THE KNIGHT FOUNDATION COMMISSION REPORT ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETCS,
supra note 102, at 5.
330. Remarks by Kevin O'Neil, Marquette University Men's Head Basketball Coach, (Mar.
26, 1991).
331. Coaches Organize Fund For the Fired, U.S.A. Today, Apr. 5, 1989, at 2C, col.-.
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